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ILLINOIS PUBLIC LABOR RELATIONS LAWS:
A COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS
SALLY J. WHITESIDE*, ROBERT

P.

VOGT**, SHERRYL

R.

SCOTT***

In 1984, Illinois granted public employees legally protected bargaining rights through the enactment of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Act (IPLRA) and the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act
(IELRA). The primary purpose of this article is to provide an analysis
of the two new acts. Specifically, the article seeks to ascertain the legislature's intent by examining the underlying legislative history of the
Acts. The article does not attempt to resolve all of the potential issues
raised by the Acts. Rather, it seeks to identify some of the more significant issues and analyze those portions of the legislative history relevant
to those issues. This analysis is based upon a review of the following
materials: (1) Senate and House Debates; (2) House Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education, Hearings on H.B. 1530; (3) House
Committee on Labor and Commerce, Hearings on S.B. 536; (4) Governor's Amendatory Veto Messages of H.B. 1530 and S.B. 536; and
(5) House Minority Veto Analysis for H.B. 1530.
It should be noted that the committee hearings were contained on
cassette tapes; thus, citations to those materials do not include specific
page numbers. As another preliminary note, the legislature, in discussing the IPLR,4, expressly stated that it intended to follow the National
Labor Relations Act (NLRA) to the extent feasible.
I. COVERAGE
A determination of whether or not a specific employee is covered
by either the IPLRi4 or the IELR,4 must begin with an analysis of the
various definitional subsections found in the Acts. Section 3(m) of the
IPLR,, defines a "public employee" or "employee" as: "any individual employed by a public employer,' including interns and residents at
*
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The authors are grateful to Virginia Thomas for providing the materials which constitute the
legislative history and to Professor Martin Malin for his insightful guidance.
1. The IPLIA defines a "public employer" or "employer" as:
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public hospitals. . . ." The language of the NLRA contains no similar
inclusion of interns and residents. 2 Furthermore, in Cedars-SinaiMedical Center,3 the NLRB specifically found that interns and residents are
not employees as defined in § 2(3) of the NLRA. 4 The legislative history of the IPLRiA makes no reference to the inclusion of interns and
residents. Therefore, one can only speculate as to why the legislature
directly departed from the private sector precedent. Under § 18(a) of
the IPLRA, an employer can seek to enjoin a strike by employees
whose absence from work poses a clear and present danger to the
health and safety of the public.5 It is likely that the legislature's inclusion of interns and residents was based upon the following two factors:
(1) a concern for potential disruption of medical services; and (2) a
concern that interns' and residents' absence from work would pose a
clear and present danger to the health and safety of the public. The
legislature apparently felt that these factors warranted allowing the
courts to enjoin interns from striking.
Section 3(m) of the IPLRA specifically excludes certain individuals from the definition of "public employee," and, accordingly, the following individuals are not covered by the IPLRA: (1) elected officials;
(2) executive heads of a department; (3) members of boards or commissions; (4) employees of any agency, board, or commission created by
the IPLRA; (5) non-State peace officers; (6) all peace officers in the
State Department of Law Enforcement; (7) non-State firefighters and
paramedics employed by fire departments and fire protection districts;
(8) employees appointed to State positions of a temporary or emergency nature; (9) all employees of school districts and higher education
institutions; (10) managerial employees; (11) short-term employees;
(12) confidential employees; (13) independent contractors; and (14) supervisors, except as otherwise provided in the IPLRA. The legislative
The State of Illinois; any political subdivision of the State, unit of local government or
school districts; authorities including departments, divisions, bureaus, boards, commissions or other agencies of the foregoing entities; and any person acting within the scope
of his or her authority, express or implied, on behalf of such entities in dealing with its
employees; provided, however, that the term 'public employer' or 'employer' as used in
this Act does not mean and shall not include educational employers or employers as
defined in the 'Illinois Educational Labor Relations Act' enacted by the 83rd General
Assembly as now or hereafter amended.
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1603, § 3(n) (1983). See infra note 24, for the definition of an "educational employer" or "employer" under the IELRA.
2. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1982).
3. 223 NLRB 251 (1976).
4. Relying on the "fundamental difference between an educational and an employment relationship," the NLRB held that interns and residents are primarily students, rather than employees. Id.at 253.
5. This concept is discussed in greater detail in § VI infra at 904.
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history indicates that managerial, confidential, and supervisory employees were eliminated from coverage under the IPLRA in an effort to
6
put management and labor on a more even footing.
Subsections 3(j), (p), (c), and (q), respectively, define managerial
employees, 7 short-term employees, 8 confidential employees, 9 and supervisors. For purposes of the IPLR/A, a supervisor is:
An employee whose principalwork is substantiallydifferent from that

of his subordinatesand who has authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge,
direct, reward, or discipline employees, or to adjust their grievances,
or to effectively recommend such action, if the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the
consistent use of independent judgment. The term 'supervisor" includes only those individuals who devote a preponderanceof their employment time to exercising such authority, State supervisors
10
notwithstanding.

This language is substantially the same as that used to define the term
"supervisor" under the NLR,4."1 The italicized clauses above are those
which do not appear in the NLRA definition.' 2 The legislative history
seems to indicate that the percentage of time devoted to "supervisory
duties" will be a factor, if not the only factor, used in determining
whether an individual devotes a preponderance of his time to exercising "supervisory authority."' 13 This is clearly contrary to the private
6. 83rd. Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, pp. 390-91 (June 23, 1983).
7. For purposes of the IPLRA, a "managerial employee" is an individual who is engaged
predominantly in executive and management functions and is charged with the responsibility of
directing the effectuation of such management policies and practices. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1603, § 3(j) (1983).
8. A "short-term employee" is defined as an employee who is employed for less than two
consecutive calendar quarters during a calendar year and who does not have a reasonable assurance that he or she will be rehired by the same employer for the same service in a subsequent
calendar year. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48 1603, § 3(p) (1983).
9. Under the IPLB4, a "confidential employee" is an employee who, in the regular course
of his or her duties, assists and acts in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine,
and effectuate management policies with regard to labor relations or who, in the regular course of
his or her duties, has authorized access to information relating to the effectuation or review of the
employer's collective bargaining policies. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1603, § 3(c) (1983).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1603, § 3(q) (1983).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1982).
12. House Amendment No. 38 added these clauses to the definition contained in the IPLR4
as introduced. See 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B., 536, pp. 284-88 (June 24, 1983).
13. During the House Debates on S.B. 536, the following dialogue took place:
Representative Hoffman:
"I'm chairman of a social studies department at a small suburban high school where
I spend . . . 40% of my time in the classroom and then . . . 10% of the time ...
with the responsibility as the chairman of the department or, to translate it into total
percentage, I guess it would be 80% and 20%. And that's fairly typical of the supervisors or the department chairmen in our high school. Would this language prohibit
the department chairmen in the high school where I teach from organizing their
own bargaining unit?"
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sector practice in which the percentage of time spent on supervisory
duties is immaterial to the determination of whether or not an individ4
ual is a supervisor.'
The legislative history reflects that supervisors were excluded from
the coverage of the IPL,4 (except as otherwise provided) as a result of
the legislature's belief that supervisory personnel should not be members of the same bargaining unit as non-supervisory personnel. The
legislature was concerned with management's right to have someone on
its side of the bargaining table.' 5 In addition, there was a concern that
the inclusion of supervisors and non-supervisors in the same unit could
lead to "unions really having a stranglehold on certain operations in
16
certain state agencies."
According to Representative Grieman, the final definition of "supervisors" was the result of a compromise between management and
labor. Labor had its own definition,' 7 while management argued for
one that more closely resembled the language contained in the
NLR,4.18 In the House debate on Amendment No. 38, Representative
Davis expressed the opinion that the ultimate definition is so narrow
that very few individuals will be deemed supervisors under the IPLRA. t9 Although he did not point to any language in particular, Representative Davis probably was referring to the following: "The term
'supervisor' includes only those individuals who devote a preponder.
ance of their employment time to exercising such authority ...
There are two exceptions to the general exclusion of supervisors
found in § 2(m) of the IPLR,4. First, existing bargaining units consistRepresentative Grieman:
"Are you presently organizing a supervisory unit?"
Representative Hoffman:
"No."

Representative Grieman:
"Then you could not under this Bill... [Slupervisors, unless they are presently in a
supervisory unit, cannot organize in supervisory units after this Bill."
Representative Hoffman:
"But since a preponderance of my time is not spent in supervision, I would be required to become part of the teachers bargaining unit. Is that correct?"
Representative Grieman: "I guess if you're a teacher, you're a teacher. You would not
have been a supervisor before either."
83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, pp. 287-88 (June 24, 1983).
14. See, Morrison v. Shopmen's Local Union 682, 114 F. Supp. 54, 57-58 (W.D. Ky. 1953);
American Cable & Radio Corp., 121 NLRB 258, 259-60 (1958).
15. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Labor/Commerce, Hearings on June 8, 1983.
16. Id
17. Representative Grieman did not state the terms of the definition proposed by labor.
18. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, p. 284 (June 24, 1983).
19. Id.
3
20. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1603, § (q) (1983).
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ing of supervisors only, or supervisors and non-supervisors, are
"grandfathered" into coverage. 2 1 Second, an employer can agree to
permit its supervisory employees to form bargaining units.22 While the
legislative concern focused on the inclusion of supervisors and nonsupervisors in one unit, the Act does not merely exclude supervisors
from non-supervisory units. Rather, supervisors are completely excluded from coverage under the Act, except as provided in the above23
mentioned exceptions.
Under the IELRA, the following individuals are excluded from
the definitions of "educational employee" and "employee": (1) supervisors; (2) managerial employees; (3) confidential employees; (4) shortterm employees; (5) student and part-time academic employees of community colleges employed full or part time by an educational employer;24 (6) elected officials; and (7) appointees of the Governor with
25
the advice and consent of the Senate.
The IELRA defines a supervisor as:
Any individual having authority in the interests of the employer to
hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, reward or
discipline other employees within the appropriate bargaining unit
and adjust their grievances, or to effectively recommend such action !f
the exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature but requires the use of independent ]udgment. The term "supervisor' includes only those individuals who devote a preponderance
of their
26
employment time to the exercise of such authority.

The italicized language, recommended by the Governor in his Amendatory Veto Message, 27 significantly restricted the group of individuals
which could potentially be deemed supervisors.
The terms "managerial employees" 28 and "confidential employ29
ees" are defined by the IELR4 in precisely the same language used in
21. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1 1603, § 3(r)(1) (1983).
22. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1 1603, § 3(r)(2) (1983).
23. These exceptions are also discussed in § II, infra at 891-92.
24. The IELRA defines an "educational employer" or "employer" as:
The governing body of a public school district, combination of public school districts,
including the governing body of joint agreements of any type formed by 2 or more
school districts, public community college district or State college or university, and any
State agency whose major function is providing educational services.
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1 1702, § 2(a) (1983).
25. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 11702, § 2(b) (1983). It is interesting to note that the exclusion of
managerial, confidential, short-term employees, student and part-time academic employees of
community colleges was recommended by Governor Thompson. See Governor's Amendatory
Veto Message of H.B. 1530, p. 2 (September 23, 1983).
26. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, $ 1702, § 2(g) (1983).
27. Governor's Amendatory Veto Message of H.B. 1530, pp. 2-3 (September 23, 1983).
28. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1702, § 2(o) (1983).
29. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1702, § 2(n) (1983).
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the IPLRI.30 The IELR,4 does not define "short-term employee" and
the legislative history does not indicate whether the meaning given to
3
this term under § 3 (p) of the IPLRA is intended to apply. '
House Bill 1530, as passed by the General Assembly, did not exclude part-time academic employees of community colleges from the
definition of employee. During the debates, concern was expressed
with respect to the possibility of part-time faculty and full-time faculty
forming a single bargaining unit. The legislature realized that from a
practical standpoint, the inclusion of part-time instructors in the bargaining unit would "cause serious governance problems. ' 32 Part-time
faculty at community colleges often significantly outnumber full-time
faculty. If included in the same unit, a group of part-time instructors
who do not rely on their positions at the community college as their
33
primary source of income could outvote the full-time instructors.
There was also a concern that the cost of providing collective bargaining to part-time faculty would exceed the revenues and fundings re34
ceived by community colleges.
The Governor addressed these concerns in his Amendatory Veto
Message. He recommended that part-time faculty be excluded from
the definition of "employee" under the IELRA. In addition, he recommended that part-time academic employees of community colleges be
defined as: "those employees who provide less than 6 credit hours of
instruction per academic semester." 3 5 The House Minority Staff Veto
Analysis pointed out that this definition is not terribly useful because a
typical part-time academic employee of a community college teaches
two classes--each worth three credit hours. Accordingly, the Analysis
suggested that a more useful definition would be: "six or fewer credit
hours per semester." 3 6 Ultimately, the legislature rejected the suggestions of the Analysis and adopted the Amendatory Veto definition of
part-time faculty.
The concern regarding the inclusion of part-time faculty and fulltime faculty in one bargaining unit could have been alleviated by
30. See supranotes 6 and 9. These definitions of the terms "managerial employee" and "con-

fidential employee" were recommended for inclusion in the IEL.RA by Governor Thompson. See
Governor's Amendatory Veto Message of House Bill 1530, p. 3 (September 23, 1983).
31.

32.
on May
33.
34.
Assem.,
35.
36.

See supra note 8.

83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education, Hearings
6, 1983.
Id.
83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on H.B. 1530, pp. 529-31 (May 26, 1983); 83rd Gen.
House Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education, Hearings on May 6, 1983.
Governor's Amendatory Veto Message of H.B. 1530, p. 2 (September 23, 1983).
House Minority Veto Analysis for H.B. 1530, pp. 3-4.
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merely providing that each must form its own unit. Instead, part-time
academic employees of community colleges were completely excluded
from the coverage of the Act. This suggests that the legislature felt that
the cost of providing collective bargaining to such employees outweighed their need for the protections of the Act.
Part-time faculty at universities are not mentioned in the legislative history, nor in the IELRA itself. Because of the extended discussion regarding part-time faculty at community colleges, it seems
reasonable to conclude that the lack of discussion with respect to universities indicates an intention that part-time faculty at universities be
included in the definition of an employee.
One further provision deserves mention in the discussion of coverage. Section 20(b) of the IPLR4 provides that the Act does not apply
to units of local government employing less than twenty-five employees, with the exception of units in existence on July 1, 1984. 37 Section
2(m) defines the term "employee" for purposes of the Act. Therefore, it
is reasonable to conclude that the twenty-five employees required
under § 20(b) must be employees as defined in § 2(m), not merely employees as the term is generically used.
II.

ELECTIONS AND RECOGNITION

Section 9 of the IPLRA and Sections 7 and 8 of the IELRA describe the procedures for the determination of an appropriate bargaining unit, as well as the procedures for recognition and election of the
exclusive representative of such a unit.
A.

Determination of an Appropriate Bargaining Unit

Under both the IPLA and the IELA, the Board determines
whether or not a particular unit is appropriate for purposes of collective
bargaining. 38 The IPLRA
states that the Board's decision shall be
based upon, but not limited to, the following factors: (1) historical pattern of recognition; (2) community of interest, including employee
skills and functions; (3) degree of functional integration; (4) interchangeability and contact among employees; (5) fragmentation of employee groups; (6) common supervision; (7) wages, hours, and other
working conditions of the employees involved; and (8) the desires of
the employees. The IPLRA specifically provides, however, that it shall
not use fragmentation as the sole or predominant factor in determining
37. There is no similar provision contained in the IELRA.
38. ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 48, 1609, § 9(b), 1707, § 7(a) (1983).
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an appropriate bargaining unit. Under the IELR,4,the list of factors is
the same as above, except that "fragmentation of employee groups" is
not mentioned.
The IPLRi4 and the IELR4 both provide that, notwithstanding
39
the factors listed above, where the majority of a particular "craft"
decide that they want to form a bargaining unit, the Board must designate it as an appropriate bargaining unit. 40 This clearly departs from
the craft severance precedent in the private sector.4 ' Under the NLR4,
a craft severance vote is not determinative.4 2 In deciding whether to
sever a group of craft employees, the NLRB relies on several factors:
(1) the history and pattern of collective bargaining in the industry involved; (2) the degree of integration of the employer's production
processes; (3) the qualifications of the union seeking to "carve out" a
separate unit; and (4) the history of collective bargaining of the employees sought.4 3 Governor Thompson recommended the craft severance provision found in § 9(b) of the IPLRA and § 7(a) of the
IELR .44 Although the legislative history is silent with respect to this
provision, it is reasonable to assume that the Governor believed that
the protection of the rights and interests of members of skilled crafts
outweighed the potential harm to employers that can result from
45
fragmentation.
Both Acts prohibit their respective Boards from designating as appropriate a unit which includes both professional and nonprofessional
employees, unless a majority of each group votes in favor of inclusion. 46 Here the Acts differ from the NLR4,which requires only that a
47
majority of the professional employees vote in favor of such a unit.
The legislative history sheds no light on the reasons for the decision not
39. Under both Acts, "craft employees" include: "skilled journeymen, crafts persons, and
their apprentices and helpers." ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1603, § 3(d) 1702, § 2(p) (1983).
40.
41.
42.

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1 1609, § 9(b) 1 1707, § 7(a) (1983).
Mallinckrodt Chemical Works, 162 NLRB 387 (1966).
decide that any craft unit is
The NLR,4 merely provides that: "The Board shall not ...

inappropriate. . . on the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination, unless a majority of the employees in a proposed craft unit vote against separate representation. 29 U.S.C. § 159(b)(2) (1982).
43. 162 NLRB at 397.
44. Governor's Amendatory Veto Message of H.B. 1530 p. 4 (September 23, 1983).
45. As the Board stated in Mallinckrodr. ". . . the interests of all employees in continuing to
bargain together in order to maintain their collective strength, as well as the public interests of the
employer in maintaining overall plant stability in labor relations and uninterrupted operation of
integrated industrial or commercial facilities, may favor adherence to the established patterns of
bargaining." 162 NLRB at 392.
1707, § 7(a) (1983).
1609, § 9(b),
46. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
47. 29 U.S.C. § 9(b)(l) (1982).
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to follow the NLR? in this instance. The IPLR.4 defines a "professional employee" as:
Any employee engaged in work predominantly intellectual and varied in character rather than routine mental, manual,mechanical or
physical work; involving the consistent exercise of discretion and
judgment in its performance; of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized in relation
to a given period of time; and requiring advanced knowledge in a
field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general
academic education or from apprenticeship or from training in the
performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or any
employee who has completed the courses of specialized intellectual
instruction and study prescribed above and is performing related
work under the supervision of a professional person
to qualify to be48
come a professional employee as defined above.
The IELRA contains two definitions of the term "professional employee."'49 One of these definitions is exactly the same as the abovequoted language from the IPLRA. This particular definition applies in
the case of a public community college, a State agency whose major
function is providing educational services, and the Illinois School for
the Visually Impaired. On the other hand, in the case of any public
school district, a "professional employee" means any employee who
has been issued a certificate under Article 21 or Section 34-83 of the
School Code. 50 This, of course, is logical because: (1) whether or not
an employee has been State-certified (under § 34-83 of the School
Code) is a simple test to apply; and (2) it would be inconsistent for a
particular educational employee to be certified by the State and yet not
be deemed a "professional".
Under the IPLRA, a bargaining unit determined by the Board
cannot include both supervisors and non-supervisors, unless such a unit
was already in existence on July 1, 1984 (the effective date of the IFLR). 5 1 Furthermore, the IPLRA provides that a unit determined by
the Board shall not be comprised solely of supervisors, unless such unit
48. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1 1603, § 3(1) (1983). This subsection uses precisely the same
language as that found in the definition of a professional employee under the NLRA. See 29
U.S.C. § 152(12) (1982).
49. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1 1702, § 2(k) (1983).
50. The legislative history indicates that the IELRA includes two standards in order to address two different situations: (1)the university-type structure and (2) the elementary and secondary education structure. The legislature clearly intended that with respect to elementary and
secondary education, only those persons who are certified under the statutes of the State will be
considered "professional employees" under the IELR4. See 83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee
on Elementary and Secondary Education, Hearings on May 6, 1983.
51. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1 1602, § 2(r)(l), 1 1609, § 9(b) (1983).
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predated the Act.5 2 However, a public employer can agree to allow its
supervisory employees to form a unit and can bargain with that unit, in
3
which case the provisions of the IPLRA1 would still apply.
With respect to determination of an appropriate bargaining unit,
the IPLRA further provides that:
In cases involving an historical pattern of recognition, and in cases
where the employer has recognized the union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for a specified existing unit, the Board shall
the union pursufind the employees in the union then represented 5by
4
ant to the recognition to be an appropriate unit.
B.

Recognition of an Exclusive BargainingRepresentative

Under both the IPLRAI and the 1ELRA, there are two methods for
recognition of an exclusive representative: (1) an election of a labor
organization as an exclusive representative; or (2) voluntary recognition by the employer. 5 The first method requires that a petition be filed
with the Board. The petition can assert one of three claims. First, a
public employee or group of employees (or a labor organization acting
on their behalf) may demonstrate that 30% of the public employees in
an appropriate unit wish to be represented by a labor organization as
its exclusive representative. Second, a public employee or group of employees (or a labor organization on their behalf) may demonstrate that
30% of the public employees in an appropriate unit assert that the labor
organization which has been acting as the exclusive bargaining representative is no longer the representative of a majority of the public employees in the unit.5 6 Third, an employer may assert that one or more
labor organizations have presented a claim to be recognized as an exclusive representative of the majority of employees in a unit.
52. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1602, § 9(r)(1) (1983).
53. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1602, § 9(r)(2) (1983). For a more detailed discussion of the
legislative history regarding IPLRA1 §§ 3(r)(1), (2), see supra § I, at 887.
54. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1609, § 9(b) (1983).
55. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1609, § 9, 1707, § 7 (1983).
56. IPLRA § 9(c) and IELRA § 7(a) both include the following provision:
Nothing in this Act shall interfere with or negate the current representation rights or
patterns and practices of employee organizations which have historically represented
employees for the purposes of collective bargaining, including but not limited to the
negotiation of wages, hours and working conditions, resolutions of employees' grievances, or resolution of jurisdictional disputes, or the establishment and maintenance of
prevailing wage rates, unless a majority of the employees so represented expresses a contrary desire under the procedures set forth in this Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1609, § 9(c) (1983),
1707, § 7(a) (1983). This provision clearly illustrates the legislature's intent to "grandfather" into recognition those relationships existing at the
effective dates of the Acts. See 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 5 (May 18,
1983); 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, pp. 110-11 (June 30, 1983).
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After the Board has received the petition, it shall conduct an investigation. 57 If, as a result of the investigation, the Board has reasonable
cause to suspect that a question of representation exists, it shall conduct
a hearing. However, if the parties so desire, they may waive the hearings and conduct a consent election. If a hearing is conducted and the
Board determines that there is still a question of representation, it shall
58
direct an election.
Under both Acts, the election is by secret ballot and must be conducted in accordance with the rules and regulations established by the
respective Boards. 59 The IELRiA provides that at least 30 days before
the election, the Board must notify the parties of the time and place of
the election. 60 In addition, both Acts essentially follow the NLRB's Excelsior rule, 6 ' requiring the employer to make available to all parties
interested in the outcome of the election the names and addresses of all
employees eligible to vote. 62 Section 9(e) of the IPL.RA specifically
provides that the Board shall determine which employees are eligible to
63
participate in the election.
The IPLRA and the IELRA both require that an incumbent exclusive representative be automatically placed on the ballot. The ballot
must also allow employees to indicate a preference for "no representative". 64 In addition, the IELRA provides that an intervening labor organization may be placed on the ballot if such organization is
supported by at least 15% of the employees in the unit.6 5 IELRA § 8
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
The IELRA requires that
was filed. ILL. REV. STAT.
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

1609, § 9(a)(2) (1983),
1707, § 7(c) (1983).
the election be held no later than 90 days after the date the
Ch. 48, 1707, § 7(c) (1983).
1609, § 9(a)(2), 1708, § 8 (1983).
60. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1708, § 8 (1983).
61. Excelsior Underwear Inc., 156 NLRB 1236 (1966).
62. Specifically, the (ELRA requires that upon request, the Board must provide the parties
(at least 15 days before the election) with a list of the names and addresses of all persons eligible to
vote. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1708, § 8 (1983). The IPLRA, on the other hand, states that
within seven days after the Board orders an election (or executes a stipulation for purposes of a
consent election), the employer must submit to the labor organization(s) a list of the names and
addresses of the employees who are eligible to vote. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1609, § 9(d) (1983).
63. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1609, § 9(e) (1983).
64. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1609, § 9(e), 1708, § 8 (1983).
65. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1708, § 8 (1983). The IPLRA does not specify what percentage
of employees of a unit must support a labor organization in order for such organization to be
placed on the ballot. The legislative history is similarly silent on this issue. Under the IELRA, a
labor organization must be supported by 15% of the employees in a unit in order to intervene in a
voluntary recognition or to be placed on a ballot. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1707, §§ 7(b), 9
(1983). In the case of a voluntary recognition under the IPLRA, an intervening organization must
be supported by 10% of the employees in a unit. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1609, § 9(g) (1983). It
therefore seems reasonable to assume that the legislature intended that under the IPL.RA, an
organization must have the support of 10% of the employees in a unit in order to be placed on the
ballot.
57.
58.
petition
59.
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prohibits balloting by mail, except by individuals who would otherwise
be unable to cast a ballot.
According to the terms of both Acts, the labor organization which
receives a majority of the votes cast shall be certified by the Board as
the exclusive representative of all employees in the unit.66 The IELRA
provides that if the choice "no representative" receives a majority, the
employer shall not recognize any exclusive bargaining representative
for at least 12 months. 67 Section 9(d) of the IPLR,4 provides that in
such a case, the Board shall certify that the majority of the employees
in the unit have chosen not to be represented by a labor organization.
However, IPLRA § 9(e) prohibits the Board from conducting an election in any bargaining unit in which a valid election has been held in
the preceding 12 months. 68 Under both Acts, if none of the choices on
the ballot receives a majority of the votes cast, a runoff must be conducted between the two choices receiving the largest number of votes.
Section 8 of the IELR,4 provides that the results of the election
shall be certified by the Board within five working days after the final
tally of votes. However, if a charge is filed alleging the occurrence of
improper conduct which affected the outcome of the election, the
Board must promptly investigate such allegations. If the Board finds
probable cause to believe that improper conduct occurred which could
have affected the election's outcome, it must set a hearing date. The
hearing must take place no later than two weeks after the date on
which the charge was filed. If the hearing results in a Board determination that the outcome of the election was indeed affected by improper
conduct, the Board must order a new election. It shall also order any
corrective action deemed necessary to assure fairness in the new election. If, however, the Board determines (upon investigation or after a
hearing) that the outcome of the election was not affected by any type
69
of improper conduct, it shall immediately certify the election results.
The IPLR,4 addresses the issue of improper election conduct by providing that the Board shall establish rules governing the conduct of the
70
election or conduct affecting the results of an election.
Section 9(h) of the IPLR,4 and Section 7(c)(2) of the IELRA prohibit the respective Boards from directing an election in any bargaining
66. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

1609, § 9(e), 1 1708, § 8 (1983).

67. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1 1708, § 8 (1983).
68. This same provision is contained in the IELR,4 ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

(1983).
69. Id
70. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

1608, § 9(e) (1983).

1708, § 8
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unit where there is a valid collective bargaining agreement already in
force. Each of these sections, however, includes an exception to this
general prohibition. For purposes of the IPLRA4, the Board may process an election petition that has been filed between 90 and 60 days
prior to the expiration date of the bargaining agreement. IELRA
§ 7(c)(2) allows the Board to direct an election after the filing of a petition between January 15 and March 1 of the final year of a bargaining
7
agreement. '
The IPLRA provides that a collective bargaining agreement that
has been in force for over three years cannot bar an election petitioned
by persons who were not parties to the agreement. 72 Under the
IELR,4, a collective bargaining agreement of less than three years can
be extended to three years by the parties. However, the extension must
be agreed to in writing before the filing of a petition for recognition of a
73
labor organization under § 7(a) of the IELRA4.
The second method of recognition of an exclusive representative is
voluntary recognition by an employer. If a particular labor organization represents a majority of the employees in an appropriate unit, the
employer may consent to recognize that organization as the exclusive
representative of the unit. The IPLR,4 provides that the labor organization which is selected by the majority of the employees in a unit
which has no other recognized or certified representative for purposes
of collective bargaining may request recognition by the employer in
writing. The employer must then post this written request for a period
of at least 20 days after the receipt of the request. 74 IELR4 requires
that the employer post for at least 20 school days a notice of its intent to
recognize the particular labor organization. 75 Under both Acts, the request and the notice must be posted on bulletin boards or other places
used for employee notices.
During the 10-day period, certain other interested employee organizations may petition the Board for recognition as the exclusive representative of the unit. Such organizations must have been designated by
a minimum percentage 76 of employees in an appropriate unit which
includes all or some of the employees in the unit recognized by the
71. Thus, the IELRA seems to assume that all collective bargaining agreements will be tied
to the school year.
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

1609, § 9(h) (1983).

73. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

1707, § 7(c) (1983).

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

1609, § 9(h) (1983).
1707, § 7(b) (1983).

72.
74.
75.

76. The IPLRA requires 10% and the IELR,4 requires 15%. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1 1609,
§ 9 (g), $ 1707, § 7(b) (1983).

CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW

employer. Where a petition is filed by one or more of such organizations, the Board must proceed with the petition(s) in the same manner
as described above in the discussion of recognition by Board
77
designation.
III.

RECOGNITIONAL PICKETING

Section 10(7) of the IPLR,4 makes it an unfair labor practice for a
labor organization or its agents to participate in recognitional picketing. The language of this section is precisely the same as that found in
§ 8(b)(7) and § 8(c) of the NLRA. 78 The IELRA4 does not address
recognitional picketing. The legislative history indicates that this absence of a specific prohibition of recognitional picketing is attributable
to the legislature's belief that such picketing would never occur in situations to which the IELRA4 would apply. 79 During one of the debates,
a legislator questioned the absence of such a prohibition. Senator
Bruce responded by stating that, "I can see no reason why there would
ever be a recognition strike, you'd just submit names to the Educational
Labor Relations Board and they shall conduct an election. . .. "1,0
If recognitional picketing does occur, certainly the issue will be
raised as to whether or not such conduct constitutes an unfair labor
practice under the IELR,4. This issue is not directly addressed by the
Act itself, nor by its legislative history. However, throughout the legislative history and the IELA itself, the legislature has manifested an
intent to protect the rights of educational employers, and, in so doing,
to prevent the disruption of the school year. When recognitional picketing was discussed during the debates, there was clearly no express
statement of an intent that such picketing [not] be deemed an unfair
labor practice. The IPLR,4 is slightly less protective of employer's
rights than the IEL.RA. Nevertheless, recognitional picketing does constitute an unfair labor practice under the IPLRA. Based upon these
factors, it is reasonable to assume that the legislature intended that if
recognitional picketing does occur in the educational setting, it will be
deemed an unfair labor practice under the IELA.

77.
78.
NLRA.
79.
80.

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1609, § 9(g),
1707, § 7(b) (1983).
29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7), (c) (1982), House Amendment No. 38 added the provision from the
See 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, p. 118 (June 30, 1983).
83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 23 (June 27, 1983).
Id.
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IV.

MANAGEMENT RIGHTS UNDER THE

I.P.L.R.A.

AND THE

I.E.L.R.A.
Both the IPLR,4 and IELR,4 include a management rights section,
granting employers statutory bargaining rights.8 ' Unlike the NLRA,
which contains no similar provisions, the newly enacted Illinois Public
Labor Relations Acts affirmatively grant management legally protected
rights. Essentially, the management rights clause of both Acts gives
management the right to refuse to bargain over matters of inherent
82
managerial policy.

"Inherent managerial policies" include the functions of the employer, standards of services, the employer's overall budget, the organizational structure, selection of new employees, and the direction of
employees. 83 A limitation on management rights arises, however,
where a management policy "directly" affects wages, hours, and terms
and conditions of employment. 84 If a policy matter does directly affect
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment, 85 management
is required to bargain collectively over the policy and its potential
effect.86
In addition to setting forth what constitutes an "inherent managerial policy", the management rights clause of each Act contains a
"grandfather" clause. 87 Under the "grandfather" clause, management
is required to bargain over any matter concerning wages, hours, or conditions of employment which it has bargained for, and agreedto, in a
collective bargaining agreement executed prior to the effective date of
the new Acts. 88 Thus, both Acts seek to preserve those rights which
81. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1604, § 4, 1 1704, § 4, (1983).
82. Id.
83. Id. These are the "areas of discretion or policy" which management alone possesses the
right to control unless such a policy "directly" affects wages, hours or terms and conditions of
employment. See Notes 102-04 and accompanying text. The IELRA4, unlike the IPLRA, also
includes within management's policy-making authority the right of management to determine
"examination techniques".
84. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1604, § 4, 1704, § 4, (1983).
85. "Or the impact thereon." Id. The legislature, during the debates on both Acts, failed to
discuss the degree of impact required before management is required to collectively bargain over a
policy matter. Arguably, almost every policy decision has an impact on employees' wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment. The exact parameters of the language "or the
impact thereon" will therefore have to be determined through Board rules and court decisions.
86. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1604, § 4, 1704, § 4, (1983).
87. Id. The Acts provide: "To preserve the rights of employers and exclusive representatives
which have established collective bargaining relationships or negotiated collective bargaining
agreements prior to the effective date of this Act, employers shall be required to bargain collectively with regard to any matter concerning wages, hours, or conditions of employment about
which they have bargained for and agreed to in a collective bargaining agreement prior to the
effective date of this Act."
88. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1604, § 4, 1 1704, § 4 (1983).
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employees have obtained prior to the enactment of the new Public Labor Relations Laws. The "grandfather" clauses reflect the legislative
intent that the Acts should aid in resolving the turmoil which often
surrounds public sector collective bargaining without infringing on the
rights which employees had already obtained. 89
The management rights clause of the IELRA4. was incorporated by
Governor Thompson via his amendatory veto. 90 The IPLR,4, on the
other hand, gained its management rights clause through an amendment by Senator Grieman. 9' In presenting his amendment, however,
Senator Grieman failed to elaborate on the scope of the management
rights section. 92 Consequently, to ascertain the legislature's intent, it is
necessary to focus on the language of other management rights clauses
rejected by the legislature and case law from other states interpreting
similar management rights clauses.
Representative Davis offered a management rights clause as an
amendment to the IPLR,4.93 Davis' Amendment read:
Public employers should not be required to bargain over matters of
inherent managerial policy, which should include, but shall not be
limited to, such areas of discretion or policy as the functions and
programs of the employer, the standards of services, the overall
budget, the utilization of technology, and the 94
organizational structure, and selection, and direction of personnel.
Davis' amendment is similar to management rights clauses in Nevada 95
89. This intent was underscored during the House debates on the IELR,4. Representative
Stuffle, arguing in opposition to an early draft of a management rights clause, stated: "If they've
(management) agreed in the past to bargain, and they're bargaining over an issue, they (management) should not be able to assert something is a management right that in the past they bargained for." 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debates on S.B. 536, p. 282 (June 23, 1983). See also the
prefatory "policy" sections of the IPLRA (Sec. 2) and the IELRA (Sec. 1), which generally discuss
the purpose of the Acts as being the "prevention of labor strife". If the new labor laws enacted by
the Illinois legislature negated rights previously obtained by employees through contract negotiations, it is evident that such legislation would not be a step toward preventing future labor strife.
90. Governor Thompson's Amendatory Veto of September 23, 1983, p 3. The Governor included the management rights section in an effort to equalize the bargaining power of both management and labor. Id., p. 1.
91. 83rd Gen. Assem. House Debates on S.B. 536, p. 279 (June 23, 1983).
92. Id Grieman's Amendment basically restructured the entire Act. In addressing the newly
included management rights clause he stated: "We put in a management rights provision. I say to
you, it limits employees basically to bargain collectively with their employer on wages, on the
conditions of working, on the traditional things that people have bargained for collectively. It
opens no broad vistas, and if anything, it is a narrowing because it says, 'inherent managerial
rights are left to the employer' ".
93. 83rd Gen. Assem. House debates on S.B. 536, p. 279 (June 23, 1983).
94. Id.
95. NEv. REV. STAT. Sec. 288.150(2) (1975). Each local government employer is entitled,
without negotiation or reference to any agreement resulting from negotiation: a) to direct its employees; b) hire, promote, classify, transfer, assign, retain, suspend, demote, discharge, or take
disciplinary action against any employee; c) to relieve any employee from duty because of lack of
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and Kansas public labor relations statutes. 96 Courts applying these
statutes have been faced with conflicts between the rights claimed by
employers under management rights clauses, and the rights asserted by
employees under other provisions of the statutes. 97 Employees claimed
that certain topics fell within the scope of collective bargaining because
the topics affected employees' wages, hours and conditions of employment. 9 8 Employers, on the other hand, disagreed, asserting that the
topics were part of management's discretionary authority. 99 To rectify
this apparent conflict, courts in Kansas and Nevada adopted a balancing test. °0 Because of a lack of legislative guidance, the courts were
free to determine under what circumstances management would be required to bargain with employees over the exercise of a managerial
right which affected employees wages, hours, and terms and conditions
of employment. Thus, had Representative Davis' amendment been
adopted, it is evident that like Nevada and Kansas, the Illinois judiciary would have been free to determine what relationship must exist
between a management right and an employee's wages, hours, and
terms and conditions of employment before management was obligated
to bargain over the issue.' 01
work or for any other legitimate reason; d) to maintain the efficiency of its governmental operation; e) to determine the methods, means and personnel by which the operations are to be conducted; and f) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out its responsibilities in
situations of emergency.
96. KAN. REV. STAT. 75-4326 (1980). Nothing in this Act is intended to circumscribe or
modify the existing right of a public employer to: (a) direct the work of its employees; (b) hire,
promote, demote, transfer, assign and retain employees in positions within the public agency;
(c) suspend or discharge employees for proper cause; (d) maintain the efficiency of governmental
operation; (e) relieve employees from duties because of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons; (f) determine the methods, means, and personnel by which operations are to be carried on.
97. The conflict arose when employees claimed that certain matters fell within"wages, hours,
and other terms and conditions of employment." See NEv. REV. STAT. Sec. 288.150(1) (1975)
(granting Nevada public employees the right to collectively bargain over wages, hours, and terms
and conditions of employment) and KAN. REV. STAT. 75-4325 (1980) (granting Kansas public
workers a similar right).
98. See, e.g., Clark County School District v. Local Government Employee Management
Relations Board, 530 P.2d 114, 118 (Nev. 1974) and National Education Association v. Board of
Education, 212 Kan. 741, 753, 512 P.2d 426, 435 (1973).
99. Id.
100. The Nevada Supreme Court determined that management is required to bargain when
the exercise of its rights is "significantly related" to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions
of employment. Clark County School District v.Local Government Employee Management Relations Board, 530 P.2d 114, 118 (Nev. 1974). The Kansas Supreme Court, on the other hand, found
the test to be: "The key, as we see it, is how direct the impact of an issue is on the well-being of
the individual teacher, as opposed to its effect on the operation of the school system as a whole."
National Education Association v. Board of Education, 212 Kan. 741, 753, 512 P.2d 426, 435
(1973).
101. Representative Kirkland also offered a management rights clause which was defeated.
His clause read: "employers shall have the right to manage the employees of the employer, including but not limited to hiring, promotion, transfer, assignment, or retention of employees in
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However, rather than leaving the task of establishing the required
relationship to the judiciary, the Illinois legislature 02 enunciated the
guideline which Illinois courts are to employ in resolving conflicts between management rights and the collective bargaining rights of employees. The Illinois Acts direct that management must bargain over a
policy matter only when it "directly" affects employees' wages, hours,
and terms and conditions of employment. 03 The requirement of a direct relationship evidences the legislature's desire that the scope of collective bargaining be construed narrowly.104 By employing the term
"directly," the legislature indicated clearly that management is to retain great discretion in the area of policy making. Indeed, the legislature's intent behind the use of the term "directly" is inescapable;
management is to guide the overall direction and policy making with
regard to the Illinois public sector work force. Labor can become involved only when a management policy has an immediate causal impact on matters over which employees are entitled by the Acts to
collectively bargain.
Thus, by clearly enunciating the circumstances which must exist
before management is required to bargain over an issue, the Illinois
legislature has set the standards to be applied by the judiciary. Unlike
Nevada' 0 5 and Kansas, 10 6 the Illinois legislature has refused to allow
the court system to engage in a balancing approach when faced with an
apparent conflict between management rights and employee rights. Instead, the legislature has clearly established that a direct relationship
must exist between a policy matter and employees' wages, hours, and
other conditions of employment before management is obligated to
bargain over the issue.
In sum, the management rights clauses of the IPLRA and the
IELRA grant management substantive rights. In addition, the management rights clauses establish the relationship that must exist between an employee right and a policy matter before management is
required to bargain over that policy matter. A policy matter must "diposition under its jurisdiction." 83rd Gen. Assem. House debates on H.B. 1530, p. 49 (May 18,
1983).
102. The management rights clause incorporated into the IELRA by Governor Thompson
traced the exact language of Section 4 of the IPLRA. See, ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48. 1704, § 4
(1983).
103. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1604, § 4, 1704, § 4 (1983).
104. Use of the term "directly" is significant. Websters's Third New International Dictionary,
1971, for example, defines "directly" as "without any intervening agency or instrumentality or
determining influence: without an intermediate step." p. 641.
105. See Notes 95-100 infra.
106. Id.
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rectly" affect wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employ07
ment before management must bargain over that issue. 1
V.

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RIGHTS UNDER THE

IPLRA

AND

IELRA

With the enactment of the IPLRA and IELRA, Illinois' public employees' 0 8 and educational employees' 0 9 now possess statutorily protected bargaining rights. Both the IPLRA and the IELRA grant
employees essentially the same bargaining rights. Employees have the
right to form, join, or assist any labor organization.' 0 In addition,
public employees may engage in lawful concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining, and engage in other mutual aid or protection in furtherance of collective bargaining."'I Public employees also
have the right to bargain through representatives of their own choosing
on questions of wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. 12 Finally, individual employees have the right to refrain from
engaging in employee activities which are geared toward collective
bargaining. 113
Employees are protected in the exercise of their rights against interference by employers 1 4 and employee organizations." 15 An employer or an employee organization which attempts to interfere with an
individual employee's free exercise of these statutory rights, commits
an unfair labor practice." 16 Thus, both of the Illinois Public Labor Relations Acts grant employees specific rights and specifically proscribe
7
interference with those rights by anyone. 1
The language employed in the Illinois Acts reflects the intent of
the legislature to grant Illinois public employees essentially the same
18
rights provided to private sector employees by § 7 of the NLRA.""
107. Unless management had agreed to include the issue in a collective bargaining agreement
executed before the effective dates of the Acts. See ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 481 1604, § 4 1704, § 4
(1983).
108. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1606(a), § 6(a) (1983).
109. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1703(a), § 3(a) (1983).
110. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1606(a), § 6(a),
1703(a), § 3(a) (1983).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. Employees cannot, however, voluntarily choose to refrain from participating in a
collective bargaining agreement's fair share requirement. See Notes 258-270 and accompanying
text.
114. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1610(a)(1-3), § 10(1-3), 48 1714(a)(1-4), § 14(a)(1-4) (1983).
115. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1610(b)(1-3, 6) § 10(b)(i-3, 6),
1714(b)(1-3), § 14(b)(1-3)
(1983).
116. See Notes 286-300 and accompanying text.
117. Id.
118. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1982). Section 157 reads:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organi-
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This intent is revealed by the colloquy between Senators Keats and
Collins during the Senate debates on the IPLRI. Senator Keats posed
this question: "Does the bill (the IPLRA) attempt to follow as closely
as possible the language found in the NLRAA and labor law provisions
interpreting that Act?"1 9 Senator Collins, a sponsor of the Bill, responded: "Yes, it does. Some provisions are worded almost directly
from the National Labor Relations Act.' 20 Moreover, during the debates over the IELRA in the House Committee on Elementary and
Secondary Education, Charles Rose, an attorney for the Illinois Association of School Boards, stated: "In a related matter, in the employee
rights provision, (Sec. 3(a)), which is basically out of the National Labor Relations Act, educational employees, not just unionized employees, are given the right to engage in lawful concerted activities for
mutual aid and protection."' 2' These statements, when combined with
the obvious similarity in language, clearly indicate that the Illinois legislature intended, as far as possible, to grant Illinois public employees
the same rights as those granted to private sector employees § 7 of the
NLR.A.
In adopting the NLRJA's language, however, the Illinois legislature
carefully tailored § 7 to the public sector employee. Specifically, Sec.
6(a) of the IPLRA states that employees may collectively bargain over
wages, hours, and conditions of employment "not excluded by Section
4" (management rights).' 22 Although the IELRA does not contain a
parallel provision, it does contain a management rights clause which
similarly limits employees' rights. 23 If a right asserted by private sector employees conflicts with the management rights clause, the Illinois
public sector employee does not possess that right. 124
Thus, the Illinois legislature molded § 7 of the NLRA to meet public sector requirements by including within the IPLRA and IELRA an
express management rights provision. Aside from the addition of a
zations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring

membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
119. 83rd Gen. Assem. Senate Debates on S.B. 536, p. 298, May 27, 1983.
120. Id.

121. 83rd Gen. Assem. House Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education, debates
on H.B. 1530, May 6, 1983.
122.
123.

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

1604, § 4 (1983).
1704, § 4 (1983).

124. For a further discussion of the effect of the management's rights clause see Notes 82-95
and accompanying text.
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management rights clause, and granting employees the right to strike,
the language of § 7 of the NLRA was incorporated in its entirety.
Therefore, it is evident that an Illinois public employee possesses the
same rights as an employee in the private sector unless the exercise of a
particular right conflicts with the management rights clause. As a result, the Board, as well as the courts, can look to Federal court interpretations of § 7 of the NLRA for guidance on how to apply the employee
rights section of the IPLRA and the IELRA.
In sum, the language of the Employee Rights Section of the IPLRA and IELR,4 is basically the same as that contained in § 7 of the
NLRA. However, the Illinois legislature tailored § 7 to the public sector by including a specific management rights' provision in both Acts.
Consequently, Illinois public employees possess the same rights as employees in the private sector to the extent that those rights do not conflict with the rights granted to management.
VI.

EMPLOYEES RIGHT TO STRIKE UNDER

IELRA

AND THE

IPLRA

The right to engage in a strike 125 is the greatest economic weapon
possessed by an employee.1 26 With the enactment of the IELR, and
IPLRA, Illinois public employees 27 and educational employees 28 now
have a statutory right to strike. The Illinois Acts protect employees in
the exercise of their right to strike by dictating that it is an unfair labor
practice for employers to wrongfully interfere with the rights granted
by the Acts. 129 However, under both Acts, the right to strike is not
unconditional. Instead, employees must satisfy two prerequisites
before they can engage in a legal work stoppage.
The first prerequisite limits the right to strike to those employees
whose services are unrelated to public health and safety. Both Acts
prohibit strikes by those employees whose absence from work would
30
pose a "clear and present danger to health and safety of the public".
To effectuate the legislature's intent, both Acts grant employers the
right to seek an injunction against any strike where the employees' con125. The Illinois Acts and their legislative histories fail to define what constitutes a strike. The
NLRB takes this view: "A strike exists when a group of employees ceases work in order to secure
compliance with a demand for higher wages, shorter hours, or other conditions of employment,
the refusal of which by the employer has given rise to a labor dispute." American Mfg. Concern 7
NLRB 753, 759, 2 LRRM 336 (1938).
126. Morris, The Developing Labor Law, p. 996 (1983).
127. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1617, § 17 (1983).
128. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1713, § 13 (1983).
129. See Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48 1714(a), § 14(A), 1610(A), § 10(A), 1983).
130. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1713, § 13,
1618(a), § 18(a) (1983).
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duct has created, or will create, a threat to the safety of society.' 3'
However, the procedure to obtain an injunction is different under
each Act. Under the IPLRA, the employer must first petition the
Board and allow the Board itself to make an investigation and conduct
a hearing. 132 The Board then has 72 hours to decide on whether a strike
by a particular employee group poses a danger to the public. 133 If the
Board determines that a strike by certain employees would endanger
the public, the Board then authorizes the employer to petition the circuit court for an order enjoining the strike. 134 This mechanism enables
the Board to screen each injunction request before it reaches the litigation level. The circuit court, of course, is not bound by the Board's
determination and must exercise its own independent judgment as to
whether a strike would pose a danger to society.
The IELRA, on the other hand, authorizes employers seeking to
enjoin a strike to petition the circuit court directly. 35 Unlike the IPLRA, the 1ELRA does not require Board approval of an employer's
request for an injunction. Therefore, it is the circuit court which makes
the initial, as well as final, determination as to whether a strike by educational employees endangers the health and safety of the public.
Although the intent of both Acts is that strikes should occur only
when the health and safety of the public is not endangered, the existence of a threat to the public will depend largely on the nature of the
service provided by the striking employees. For example, it is difficult
to imagine a situation where a strike by educational employees could
present a clear and present danger to the health and safety of the public. While it is obvious that school strikes may endanger the welfare of
students, 36 it is doubtful that a teacher strike could ever endanger the
public's safety. It is significant to note, on this point, that Representative Davis attempted to amend the language of § 18 of the IPLRA from
"health and safety" to read "health, safety, and welfare". 137 Arguing in
131. Id.
132. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1618(a), § 18(a) (1983).
133. The IELRA fails to define what type of employee group provides services which effect the
health and safety of society. The IPLRA, on the other hand, defines such employees as "essential". Essential employees are "those employees who perform functions so essential that the interruption of such functions constitutes a clear and present danger to the health and safety of the
persons in the affected community". ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1603(e), § 3(e) (1983).
134. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1618(a), § 18(a) (1983).
135.

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

1713, § 13 (1983).

136. A lengthy teacher's strike could, for example, jeopardize students' ability to receive college scholarship assistance as well as interfere with the students' college admissions procedure.
137. 83rd Gen. Assem. House debates on S.B. 536, p. 298. (June 24, 1983). Although slated as
an amendment to the IPLRA, the IELRA includes a similar prohibition against strikes by employees providing essential services. Consequently, because the IPLRA supercedes the IELRA (see
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support of the amendment, Davis stated that the term "welfare" would
specifically include the well-being of school children.' 38 Although Davis' amendment was defeated in the House, Davis' attempt to include
the term "welfare" in the IPLRA indicates that he was aware that a
strike by educational employees would rarely, if ever, endanger the
public's "health and safety". Thus, the first prerequisite to public sector work stoppages probably will not impede teacher's strikes.
Strikes by general public employees, on the other hand, stand on a
different footing. Because the IPLRA covers employees providing such
a broad spectrum of services, it is clear that a strike by certain classes of
employees could pose a risk to public safety. Physicians, nurses, garbage collectors and even sewer workers all provide services which,
under the proper set of circumstances, could be found to be essential to
the safety of society. However, because circumstances may differ, it is
evident that under the IPLRiA, the appropriateness of an injunction
will have to be determined on a case by case basis.
Of significant impact, however, is the legislature's intent that a
court-ordered injunction not be overbroad. The circuit court must ensure that only those employees whose services are essential to the
health and safety of the public are enjoined. The injunction may not
interfere with the right of non-essential employees to strike. During the
House Debates on the IPLR,4, Senator Grieman explained exactly how
39
the legislature intended the circuit court to exercise its discretion.
Grieman presented an example of a possible strike at Cook County
Hospital. If a strike at Cook County Hospital should occur, (assuming
all of the hospital personnel were members of the same union), dining
room personnel would be allowed to strike, whereas emergency room
physicians would be enjoined. The absence of the dining room personnel would not pose a danger to public health and safety. A work stoppage by emergency room physicians, on the other hand, would clearly
place the public's health at risk. Hence, under such circumstances, the
appropriate injunction would include only those employees whose
services were vital to the safety of society (e.g., the emergency room
physicians); any others would be permitted to strike (e.g., the dining
room personnel).
83rd Gen. Assem. Senate debates on S.B. 536, p. 101 (June 30, 1983)), expanding the IPLRA's
limitation on strikes would have had a corresponding effect on the ability of educational employees to strike.
138. Id. Davis exclaimed: "Health and welfare refers to a lot of things, and yes, indeed,
welfare refers to kids too."
139. 83rd Gen. Assem. House Debates on S.B. 536, p. 299. (June 23, 1983).
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In sum, the first prerequisite which employees must satisfy prior to
engaging in a strike is that the service provided by the employees be
one that is not closely related to the health and safety of the public. If
the employees do provide such a service, an injunction could restrict
their right to strike. Conversely, if the employees provide a service not
related to the safety of society, then the employees have surpassed the
first hurdle in their attempt to engage in a legal strike.
The second prerequisite that employees must satisfy before striking is the fulfillment of five pre-strike conditions.140 The five preconditions essentially provide alternative methods of settling the dispute
other than an official work stoppage. Thus, the Acts attempt to avoid
strikes by requiring that employees exhaust several administrative remedies before they can legally engage in a walk-out.
The first pre-strike condition dictates that the employees must select an exclusive bargaining representative.' 4 1 In other words, a strike
is prohibited when there is no union in place. In addition, it is the
legislature's intent that a strike occur only with the approval of the exclusive bargaining representative. If a strike occurs without the sanction of the exclusive bargaining representative, the representative can
obtain a court order enjoining the employees' work stoppage.' 4 2 Thus,
before a legal strike can begin, a union must represent the employees
and must sanction the walk-out.
The second pre-strike condition prohibits a work stoppage prior to
the expiration of any existing collective bargaining agreement between
the employer and employees. 43 However, the two Acts differ regarding this condition in several important respects. The IPLR,4 states that
a strike which occurs while a collective bargaining agreement is in effect is legal, provided the terms of the collective bargaining agreement
itself do not prohibit a strike.'" The IPLRA, therefore, provides the
parties with the ability to determine for themselves whether their agreement should include a no-strike provision or not.' 45 In addition, the
IPLRA allows the parties to mutually agree to binding grievance arbitration.146 However, if a grievance arbitration procedure is included in
140. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1713, § 13(a-e), 1617, § 16(a) (1-5) (1983).
141. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1617(a)(I), § 17(a)(l), 1713(a), § 18(a) (1983).
142. Senator Collins stated that an exclusive bargaining representative "can take them (the
striking employees) right into court." This statement was in response to Senator Barkhausen's
question of whether a strike must be sanctioned by the exclusive bargaining representative. 83rd
Gen. Assem. Senate debates on S.B. 536, p. 314-315. (May 27, 1983).
143. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1713(d), § 13(d),
1617(a)(2), § 17(a)(2) (1983).
144. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1617(a)(2), § 17(a)(2) (1983).
145. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1607, § 7 (1983).
146. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1617(3), § 17(3) (1983).
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the contract, the "Uniform Arbitration Act"' 14 7 bars a strike during the
term of the collective bargaining agreement.
The IELRA, on the other hand, prohibits per se a strike which
48
occurs during the pendency of a collective bargaining agreement.
The IELRA further mandates that every collective bargaining agreement in the education sector shall include a grievance arbitration procedure and shall expressly prohibit strikes during the term of the
contract. 149 Thus, it is evident that the legislature intended contracts in
the educational sector to be final and binding upon the parties throughout the term of the agreement.
The third condition that employees must satisfy before engaging in
a strike concerns the utilization of mediation procedures. Although the
language within the two Acts differs, 50 the basic thrust of this third
pre-strike condition in each Act is that mediation procedures must have
failed before a walk-out will be statutorily sanctioned.
The fourth pre-strike condition prohibits a strike where the parties
have previously agreed to submit disputed issues to binding arbitration. 15 This requirement simply acknowledges that once the parties
have chosen a forum to settle their dispute, they should thereafter be
estopped from reversing their decision. If binding arbitration is mutually agreed upon as the method of dispute resolution, employees should
not be permitted to exhibit dissatisfaction with either the progress of
the arbitration proceedings, or with the outcome, by choosing to engage
in a strike. Accordingly, both the IPLRA and IELRA dictate that if
parties agree to resolve their dispute through arbitration, the parties are
thereafter bound by their agreement.
The final precondition to a legal strike addresses notice. Under
the IPLRAA, employees must provide management with a five day notice before striking. 152 The IELRA, on the other hand, requires that the
employees provide management, the Regional Superintendent, and the
53
Board with a five day notice prior to striking.
The notice provision serves several important functions. First,
147.

148.
149.

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 10,
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

101, § I, (1983).

1713(d), § 13(d) (1983).
1710(c), §

0(c) (1983).

150. The IELRA requires that "mediation has been used without success." The IPLRA states
that "the exclusive bargaining representative has requested a mediator pursuant to Sec. 12 for the
purpose of mediation or reconciliation of a dispute." ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1617(a)(4),
§ 17(a)(4) (1983). Both Acts, therefore, require the parties to at least attempt to settle the dispute
through mediation.
151. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1617(a)(3), § 17(a)(3), 1713(e), § 13(e) (1983).
152. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1617(a)(5), § 17(a)(5) (1983).
153.

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

1713(c), § 13(c) (1983).
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under both Acts, the five day notice is, in effect, a "last chance warning" to an employer that the employees intend to strike if employee
demands are not met. Second, under both Acts, employers have five
days before a strike occurs to petition the Board for a determination of
whether a strike by the employees will constitute a "clear and present
danger to the public" thereby justifying an injunction.' 54 Third, under
the IELRA, providing notice to the Regional Superintendent and the
Board enables them to take actions to minimize the impact of the strike
55
on the school year.
If employees strike without first satisfying the five preconditions,
the strike is illegal. While the legislative history of the Acts is ambiguous, it appears that an employer may pursue three alternative remedies
in the event of a failure of employees to satisfy all the pre-strike conditions. First, the employer is authorized to take disciplinary action
against the illegally striking employees. 156 Second, the employer can
file an unfair labor practice charge with the Board against the striking
employees. 157 Third, the employer can obtain a court order enjoining
the illegal strike. 158 The remedy pursued by the employer will depend,
of course, on the facts and circumstances of each individual case.
154. See Notes 132-34 and accompanying text.
155. See The Illinois School Code, ILL. REv. STAT. Ch. 122 et seq. (1983).
156. The (PLRA grants this authority expressly in Sec. 17(b). The IELRA and its legislative
history fails to indicate whether educational employers also possess the right to discipline illegally
striking employees. However, it seems logical that educational employers also possess the right to
discipline illegally striking employees. If educational employers, when faced with an illegal strike,
were limited to only injunctory and unfair labor practice relief, employees would lose nothing by
illegally striking. On the other hand, if educational employers possessed the ability to discipline
illegally striking employees, employees covered by the IELRA would be placed on notice that
only by following the proper procedures can a legal strike be carried out.
157. Senator Collins pointed this out in response to a question about the five day notice requirement. "It would be an unfair labor practice under this law for any group to choose to go out
on a strike in any form, wildcat, or any form, work stoppage, unless they notify the Board through
their exclusive bargaining representative that a strike is going to occur at least five days prior to
the strike." 83rd Gen. Assem. Senate debates on S.B. 536, p. 112. (June 30, 1983). Although
Collins' response specifically addressed only the five day notice requirement, nonetheless, it is
reasonable to infer that Collins intended that a refusal to comply with any of the five prestrike
conditions constituted an unfair labor practice. The notice requirement is simply one of the five
preconditions that must be fulfilled by employees before they can engage in a legal strike. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the legislature meant to single out the notice provision as
the only instance where a failure to comply with one of the prestrike conditions results in an
unfair labor practice.
158. Representative Grieman identified this specifically when he summarized the highlights of
the IPL.RA. "In this Bill, there is the right of an employer to enjoin an illegal strike so that if those
people go out on strike, they will be held accountable because that will be an illegal strike." 83rd
Gen. Assem. House debates on S.B. 536, p. 295. (June 23, 1983). Although not specifically addressed in the legislative debates of the IELRA, it is evident that because both Acts treat strikes
similarily, an educational employer has the right to obtain an injunction against illegally striking
teachers. One issue not addressed by the legislature was the effect that the Anti-Injunction Act, 28
U.S.C. Sec. 2283 (1982) has on the ability of an employer to obtain an injunction.
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Thus, both Acts contain specific procedures which must be complied with before employees can engage in a legal strike. However, in
enacting the procedural steps to be followed with regard to strikes, the
Illinois legislature failed to clarify whether unreasonably dangerous
conditions can justify an otherwise illegal strike. Under both of the
Acts, an employee who stops working without fulfilling the five prestrike conditions is subject to employer discipline.' 5 9 The Acts do not
contain an exception for a situation where the employee is being forced
to work under unreasonably dangerous conditions. Although the
NLRA does not specifically deal with the issue, the NLRB has held that
an employer may not discipline an employee for participating in a
60
work stoppage precipitated by unreasonably dangerous conditions.
Although not specifically authorized by the legislature to do so, it
seems only reasonable that the Illinois Labor Relations Board would
read the IPLR,4 similarly. Public employees, like their private sector
counterparts, should not fear disciplinary action simply because they
refuse to work under unreasonably dangerous conditions.
VII.

IMPASSE PROCEDURES UNDER THE

IELRA

In enacting the IELRA4, the Illinois legislature was concerned
about teacher strikes which postpone the beginning of the new school
year. Accordingly, the legislature included within the IELR,4, a procedure geared toward reconciling a bargaining impasse prior to the commencement of the school year.' 16 Section 12 of the IELR,4 dictates
that employers and employee representatives must accept mediation if
an impasse is reached over collective bargaining matters. 62 Section 12
establishes a mediation timetable geared to the beginning of the upcoming school year. Refusal to submit a dispute to a mediator as re163
quired by Section 12, is an unfair labor practice.
The impasse procedures under Sec. 12 are triggered 90 days before
159. See note 156 infra.
160. See Roadway Express, Inc., 217 NLRB 278, 88 LRRM 1503 (1975).
161. The Illinois Acts fail to define when an impasse occurs. However, the NLRB has found:
"Whether a bargaining impasse exists is a matter of judgment. The bargaining history,
the good faith of the parties in negotiations, the length of negotiations, the importance of
the issue or issues as to which there is disagreement, the contemparaneous understanding
of the parties as to the state of negotiations are all relevant factors to be considered in
deciding whether an impasse in bargaining exists." Taft Broadcasting Company, 163
NLRB 475, 64 LRRM 1386 (1967).
162. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1712, § 12 (1983).
163. Sec. 14(a)(5) of the IELRA states that an employer's refusal to collectively bargain in
good faith with an employee representative constitutes an unfair labor practice. ILL. REV. STAT.
Ch. 48, 1714(a)(5), § 14(a)(5) (1983). Likewise, § 14(b)(2) identifies an employee representative's
refusal to collectively bargain in good faith with an employer as an unfair labor practice. ILL.
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the scheduled start of the school year. 64 At the 90 day point, the parties are required to advise the Board of the status of contract negotiations. 65 If the parties have not reached agreement at that point, they
are granted 45 days to continue to bargain under their own guidelines. 1 66 Failure to reach agreement by the expiration of this 45-day
67
period entitles either party, or the Board itself, to seek mediation.
However, if the parties have failed to execute a contract 15 days before
the start of the forthcoming school year, the board must order the par68
ties to submit to mediation.
The mediator's goal is, of course, to attempt to bring the parties to
agreement. Upon request of the parties, the mediator is empowered by
Section 12 to conduct hearings, make written findings of fact, 1 6 9 and
make recommendations as to the resolution of the dispute. 170 If the
parties wish to be bound by a third-party's decision, Section 12 authorizes the parties to submit the dispute to binding arbitration. '17
The flaw of the Section 12 impasse procedures, however, is that the
findings of fact and recommendations of the mediator are only advisory. The inability to enforce the mediator's recommendations, therefore, may reduce the Section 12 mediation requirement to a mere
bureaucratic formality. Employee representatives may view the mediation requirement as nothing more than a procedural prerequisite to a
strike, rather than as an opportunity to resolve a dispute without a
work stoppage. Although submission to mediation will remain a statutory necessity, 7 2 the efficacy of the procedure will be undermined if
employee representatives do not treat it as a viable alternative to a
strike.
Thus, although a mediator's job is to bring the parties close together, the effectiveness of a mediator depends primarily on whether
the parties make a good faith effort at trying to reach an agreement.
Although under Sec. 12, the mediator's recommendations and findings
of fact are not binding, nevertheless, a good faith effort by both sides,
REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1714(b)(2), § 14(b)(2) (1983). Failing to submit the dispute to a mediator, as
required by § 12, clearly amounts to a refusal to bargain in good faith.
164. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48 1712, § 12 (1983).
165. Id
166. Id.
167. Id
168. Id.
169. Id
170. Id.
171. Id
172. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1713, § 13 (1983). For a further discussion of the mediation
pre-strike condition, see Notes 150-51 and accompanying text.
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when combined with the assistance of an impartial third-party, can
lead to the resolution of a contract dispute before the students' education is interrupted.
VIII.

ARBITRATION

Arbitration can appear in a variety of forms and be implemented
in a variety of ways throughout the collective bargaining process. Both
the IPLRA and the IELPA contain provisions utilizing arbitration.
The IPLR,4 provides a form of compulsory interest arbitration over
contract terms for security employees, 73 state peace officers, state fire
fighters, and certain "essential services" employees. 74 For all other
public employees, 75 the Act allows for voluntary binding arbitration
76
on contract terms.
The procedure for compulsory interest arbitration is outlined in
Section 14 of the IPLRA. 177 Notwithstanding the provisions of this
section, the parties may agree to submit disputes to an alternative form
of impasse resolution. 178 The impasse procedure contained in the Act
provides that mediation 79 must commence thirty days prior to the expiration of a contract. Arbitration will be requested if the dispute remains unresolved fourteen days prior to the contract's expiration.
Within the next ten days each party chooses a delegate to the arbitration panel and advises the Board of this selection. Within seven days
of the request, the Board selects from the Public Employees Labor Mediation Roster seven nominees for the position of impartial arbitrator
of the panel. Within the next five days the parties peremptorily strike
the names of the nominees until they arrive at one neutral member who
173. "'Security employee' means an employee who is responsible for the supervision and control of inmates at correctional facilities, and would also include other non-security employees in
bargaining units having the majority of employees being responsible for the supervision and control of inmates at correctional facilities." ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1603, § 3(o) (1983).
174. "'Essential services employees' shall mean those public employees performing functions
so essential that the interruption or termination of such function will constitute a clear and present
danger to the health and safety of the persons in the affected community." ILL. REV. STAT. Ch.
48, 1603, § 3(e) (1983).
175. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1603, § 3(m) (1983). See § I supra at 883.
176. The Act also allows binding arbitration for grievance resolution. This will be discussed
separately in § IX at p. 920.
177. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1614, § 14 (1983).
178. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1614, § 14(o) (1983).
179. Section 12 of the IPLRA provides for the establishment of a Public Employee Mediation
Roster, the services of which are available on request of the parties for the mediation of grievances
or contract disputes. The Act indicates that the function of a mediator is "to communicate with
the employer and exclusive representative . . . and to endeavor to bring about an amicable and
voluntary settlement."
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will act as chairperson of the arbitration panel. 180
At that point the chairperson calls for a hearing to begin within
fifteen days. The chairperson presides over the hearing, which should
conclude within thirty days unless the parties agree otherwise.' 8 ' The
chairperson has discretionary authority at any time prior to an award
to remand the dispute to the parties for further collective bargaining for
a period of up to two weeks, thereby extending the overall time frame.
Furthermore, the proceedings may not be interrupted by the filing of
an unfair labor practices charge. Panel decisions are made by majority
rule.
The panel has the power to administer oaths and issue subpoenas
for the attendance of witnesses and the production of any documents it
may deem material to the resolution of the dispute. If anyone refuses
to comply, or is guilty of contempt at the hearing, the panel may elicit
the aid of the appropriate circuit court and obtain an appropriate order.' 82 A failure to comply with that order may constitute contempt of
court.
The arbitration panel uses two separate procedures for the determination of awards. First, the panel determines which of the disputed
issues are economic in nature. 83 The panel then directs each of the
parties to submit its "last offer" of settlement on each economic issue. 184 In determining which of these last offers to accept, the panel
must consider several factors set forth in the Act.' 85 The panel must
180. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1614, § 14(c) (1983). The language of this provision appears
somewhat inconsistent in that it states that the parties are allowed to strike the name of one of the
nominees. This process ultimately would result in an arbitration panel of seven members, a result
repugnant to the remaining provisions of the section. The confusion stems from the expansion of
the number of nominees the parties have to select from. The bill as presented to the Governor
provided for only three nominees. In his amendatory veto message, the Governor enlarged the
number of nominees to seven yet left the remaining provisions intact. It is reasonable to assume
that a tripartite panel was still contemplated and that the increased number of nominees merely
enlarged the parties' selection base.
181. Section 14(d) of the IPLRA provides that technical rules of evidence will not apply during the hearing and that any oral or documentary evidence that the panel deems relevant may be
admitted. However, a verbatim record of the proceedings shall be made.
182. The appropriate court shall be the circuit court within the jurisdiction in which the hear1614, § 14(e) (1983).
ing is being held. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
183. These initial determinations by the panel are conclusive.
184. The panel must so direct the parties at or prior to the conclusion of the hearing. The

parties must return with their offers within the period specified by the panel.
185. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1614, § 14(h) (1983).
1 . . the arbitration panel shall base its findings, opinions and order upon the following
factors:
(1) The lawful authority of the employer;
(2) Stipulations of the parties;
(3) The interests and welfare of the public and the financial ability of the unit of
government to meet those costs;
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accept the offer which best accommodates these considerations. As to
all other issues, the panel makes its own determination based on the
same factors.
Within thirty days of the conclusion of the hearing, unless extended by agreement of the parties, the panel makes written findings of
fact and renders an opinion. A copy of that opinion is then given to
each of the parties and the Board.1'86
The Act provides for circuit court review of the panel's award on
petition of either party. 87 The court review is limited to a determination of whether the panel was without or exceeded its authority, or the
order was arbitrary or capricious, or was procured by fraud, collusion
88
or other similarly unlawful means.
An award may be rejected in whole or in part by the public em89
ployer, but not by the employees or their exclusive representative.
All terms decided upon by the panel must be incorporated into an
agreement and ratified by the public employer's governing body. 90
(4) Comparison of the wages, hours and conditions of employment of the employees involved in the arbitration proceedings with the wages, hours and conditions of
employment of other employees performing similar services and with other employees generally:
(A) In public employment in comparable communities,
(B) In private employment in comparable communities,
(5) The average consumer prices for goods and services commonly known as the
cost of living;
(6) The overall compensation presently received by the employees, including direct wage compensation, vacations, holidays and other excused time, insurance and
pensions, medical and hospitalization benefits, the continuity and stability of employment and all other benefits received;
(7) Changes in any of the foregoing circumstances during the pendency of the arbitration proceedings;
(8) Such other factors, not confined to the foregoing, which are normally or traditionally taken into consideration in the determination of wages, hours and conditions of employment through voluntary collective bargaining, mediation, factfinding, arbitration or otherwise between the parties, in the public service or in private employment.
For a discussion of these factors, see generally, Laner and Manning, "Interest Arbitration.".4 New
Terminal Impasse Resolution Procedure for Illinois Public Sector Employees," 60 CHIiKENT L.
REV. 839 (1984).
186. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1614, § 14(g) (1983).
187. Appeal of the arbitration panel's decision may be taken to the circuit court for the county
in which the dispute arose or in which a majority of the affected employees reside.
188. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1614, § 140) (1983). The Act provides that such petitions must
be filed within ninety days of the arbitration order and that an appeal does not automatically stay
the order. Frivolous appeals will result in the petitioning party paying the attorney's fees and
costs of the successful party.
189. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1614, § 14(m) (1983).
190. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1603, § 3(h) (1983). "'Governing body' means in the case of
the State, the State Labor Relations Board, the Director of the Department of Central Management Services, and the Director of the Department of Labor; the county board in the case of the
county; the corporate authorities in the case of a municipality; and the appropriate body authorized to provide for expenditures of its funds in the case of any other unit of government."
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The governing body reviews each term decided on by the panel. If it
fails to affirmatively accept or reject a term within twenty days, the
term becomes part of the collective bargaining agreement. If the governing body rejects a term, it must provide reasons for such rejection.
The parties then return to the arbitration panel for further proceedings
and issuance of a supplemental decision as to each of the rejected
terms. That decision is then submitted to the governing body for
ratification.
The ability of an employer to reject the arbitration panel's decision
must be recognized as a significant change. The bill as passed by the
Senate provided for final and binding arbitration. Those opposed to
final and binding arbitration at that time expressed two major concerns. The first of these concerns was fiscal. Some legislators were disturbed by the possibility that an arbitrator could grant an award so
large that taxing bodies would have to raise taxes to cover the award. 19,
The second concern of opponents to arbitration grew out of a belief
that final and binding arbitration would destroy the incentive to
92
bargain.
The arbitration clause was vigorously debated in the House Committee on Labor and Commerce. 9 3 Both sides offered statistics from
surveys of other states that employed a form of compulsory arbitration.194 Opponents felt binding arbitration would spell financial disaster.' 95 The bill was amended during the second reading to allow the
191. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, pp. 312-13 (May 27, 1983). Senator
Grothberg inquired as to whether an arbitration award could force local officials to increase taxes.
Senator Collins replied that it could not.
192. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, p 309 (May 27, 1983). Senator DeAngelis.
193. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Labor and Commerce, (June 8, 1983). Mr.
Ryan, Village President of Arlington Heights, quoting Mayor Coleman Young of Detroit, "...
compulsory interest arbitration destroys collective bargaining . . . and destroys sensible fiscal
management." Mayor Nick Blaise, Niles, ". . . collective bargaining with a binding arbitration
... Steve Rosebaum, Assistant Manager of the Labor Relaclause has dramatic consequences.
"
tions Department for the Illinois State Chamber of Commerce, "It's disaster ...
194. For a full discussion of interest arbitration, including a survey of other state legislation
and its impact, see Howlett, "Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector," 60 CHI KENT L. REV. 815
(1984); Laner and Manning, "Interest Arbitration. ,A New Terminal Impasse Resolution Procedure
for Illinois Public Sector Employees," 60 Clu-KENT L. REV. 839 (1984).
195. The legislature was also concerned with the costs of administering mandatory collective
bargaining throughout the state. Consequently a heated debate, continued throughout the proceedings of both Acts, over the applicability of the States Mandates Act, ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 85,
2201 et seq. (1983). Section 21 of the IELRA and section 23 of the IPLRA provide that each Act
respectively, is exempted from the States Mandate Act. During Senate debates on S.B. 536, Senator DeAngelis presented a letter from the States Mandates Office indicating that they had reviewed S.B. 536 and considered the General Assembly's finding that the bill was excluded from
the Mandates Act in error. On several occasions amendments to the bills were proposed in an
effort to bring the Acts under the Mandates Act, each meeting with defeat. It remains to be seen
whether these provsions will survive judicial review.
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employer's governing body to reject an award.' 96 Thereafter, opposition to arbitration focused on the fact that arbitration vested final decisionmaking authority in an unaccountable third party. Proposed
amendments included referendum approval of arbitration agreements, 97 residency requirements for arbitrators, 98 and a requirement
that the arbitrator provide financial suggestions to the employer as to a
method to meet the costs of the order. 199 All failed to pass.
The Act provides no limitations on the number of times a governing body may reject a term. However, where the initial costs of arbitration are borne equally by the parties, 20 0 the employer alone bears
the cost of supplemental arbitration, including the employee representative's attorney's fees. 20' As the legislative history reveals, this imposes a subtle pressure on the employer to compare costs. 20 2 There is
no express language under the act, or discussion during the legislative
history, that states that the employer is not free to reject any term it
chooses to regardless of its reasoning. Clearly this would appease the
concerns of those who opposed third party decision-making. However,
it can reasonably be argued that an employer's arbitrary and repeated
20 3
rejections of terms may breach the duty to bargain in "good faith",
which constitutes an unfair labor practice under section 11. A major
reason behind creating the Act was to mandate bargaining between
public employers and their employees. To allow an employer to arbitrarily reject any term would defeat that purpose entirely.
The treatment of "essential service employees" is an intriguing
area of the Act. As first manifested in the Senate, 20 4 and approved by
196. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, p. 295 (June 23, 1983), Amendment 6.
197. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, p. 253 (June 24, 1983), Proposed Amendment 21.
198. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536 p. 257 (June 24, 1983), Proposed Amendment 23.
199. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, pp. 269-70 (June 24, 1983), Proposed
Amendment 31.
200. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1614, § 14(d) (1983).
201. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1614, § 14(n) (1983).
202. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debates on S.B. 536, p. 251 (June 24, 1983). Representative
Greiman, in response to proposed House amendment 20 which sought to split the costs of
arbitration.
"In most places in this Bill the costs are borne between the parties in equal shares ...
The only place where that is varied is where . . . there has been arbitration . . . and

when the governing body. . . determines that they do not want to accept the arbitrator's
award . . . then they will have to pick up the relatively small costs for the supplemental
arbitration that takes place after they have rejected it. It's. . . I suppose its just a subtle
pressure where they have to kind of compare costs. It's reasonable.
203. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1607, § 7 (1983).
204. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, p. 311 (May 27, 1983).
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the House, 20 5 employees or units who were deemed "essential" were to
be covered by the arbitration impasse procedure. In fact, this section of
the bill, as originally presented to the Governor, was captioned "Security Employees and Essential Service Employee Disputes". 20 6 The Governor deleted "Essential Service Employee" and replaced it with "State
20 7
Peace Officer and State Fire Fighter".
However, essential service employees still come under the arbitration impasse provision by virtue of section 18(a). Section 18 provides
that if a strike is about to occur, an employer may petition the Board to
determine if the strike would constitute a clear and present danger to
the health and safety of the public. 20 8 If the Board finds that the strike
would present such a danger, the employer may petition the circuit
court to enjoin the strike or to impose conditions on the strike. The
court then designates which of the employees within the unit perform
services essential to the health and safety of the public. 20 9 Those employees will then be ordered to return to work for a limited duration.
The period will be extended only upon demonstrating that the extension is necessary to protect the public health and safety from a clear
and present danger. If the court orders employees back to work, it will
also require that the employer and exclusive representative participate
in the impasse procedure of section 14. The court determines which
employees will be subject to the procedure.
Several issues are presented by this section. One area of uncertainty is the extent to which a court may rearrange employees of the
same occupation within a single unit, and, order skeletal crews to work
while others strike. Such an order would reflect an interpretation of
"essential employees" based on numbers as well as occupational category. Although the definition of "essential service employee" contained in the Act is somewhat ambiguous, 2 10 the legislative discussion
of the term evinces an intent that determinations of employee status
with regard to this classification be based solely on the nature of the
occupation. 21 t This approach would bar strikes by all members of an
occupational category deemed "essential." The alternative interpreta205. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, pp. 294-95 (June 23, 1983).
206. S.B. 536, as Enrolled, p. 14.
207. Governor's Amendatory Veto Message of S.B. 536, p. 5 (September 23, 1983).
208. See § VI supra at 904 for a discussion of the strike provision and of the meaning of clear
and present danger.
209. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, $ 1618, § 18(a) (1983).

210. See supra note 2.
211. Representative Greiman; 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debates on S.B. 536, pp. 296-97 (June
23, 1983) and House Debates on S.B. 536, p. 249 (June 24, 1983).
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tion would require that the number of essential service employees necessary to safeguard public health and safety remain on the job, while
allowing the remaining employees in the essential service group to
strike. This would allow some occupational groups to simultaneously
strike and enjoy the benefits of arbitration, a result clearly inequitable
to the employer.
However, this may very well be the result in cases where the employees of a particular unit perform different "tasks." To use the example of Representative Greiman, if the strike involved a unit consisting
of "doctors," arguably an essential service, the doctors who handle the
intensive care unit or the emergency room may be required to work.
Other doctors, such as dermatologists, may not be required to work, as
their absence would not present the same kind of threat. 21 2 Under Section 18, the court decides which employees will be covered by the arbitration procedure of section 14. The implication is that arbitration will
resolve the dispute only as to those employees enjoined from striking.
This encourages a form of judicial unit splitting. 2 13 The alternative is to
submit the entire dispute to section 14 arbitration which, as previously
discussed, is somewhat inequitable to the employer. Unfortunately, the
legislative history does not address this problem.
Finally, there is the issue of whether a judicial designation of a
group of employees as "essential" locks the group into that category for
purposes of future disputes. Clearly, an affirmative answer here would
support the position of judicial unit splitting. However, in explaining
the treatment of essential services under the Act, Representative
Greiman indicated that the determination should be made on a case by
case basis, because "fuin one moment in time, in one community, one
kind of occupation will be an essential service. At another time, [it]
will not be. .... 2t4 In light of the legislature's reasoning and the fact
that section 18 requires repeated demonstration of a clear and present
danger to require the employees to work, it would appear that the employer must obtain a judicial determination each time the situation
presents itself. However, it is conceivable that a court could relegate a
212. 83rd Gen.Assem., House Debates on S.B. 536, p. 299 (June 24, 1983).
213. A similar issue is presented by the possibility of bargaining units containing both police
or firefighters and other employees-a situation which may exist as a result of "grandfathering" in
bargaining units of smaller communities. The legislature failed to address this issue apparently
anticipating that it would not arise. However, should such a situation develop, this type of unit
may be analogized to situations where "security" and "non-security" employees are in the same
unit. Under section 3(o), where the majority are security employees, the non-security employees
are treated as security employees. Therefore the entire unit would be subject to section 14
guidelines.
214. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, pp. 296-97 (June 23, 1983).
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particular occupational category permanently to "essential" status. For
example, a court may reasonably conclude that emergency room doctors or sanitation workers are and forever will be essential service employees, and from that point forward should be covered by the
arbitration procedure and precluded from striking. This would then
place the burden on the exclusive representatives to show that the employees are no longer essential and should be allowed to strike. Finally, it should be noted that under Section 14, security officers, 21 5 state
peace officers and state fire fighters are also prohibited from striking.
The form of arbitration, governing all other public employees is
not expressly set forth in a particular section, but may be drawn from
several sections. Section 7216 describes the duty to bargain collectively.
The fourth paragraph of that section provides that the parties may, by
mutual agreement, include arbitration procedures in the collective bargaining agreement for impasses resulting from their inability to agree
on wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment. Such arbitration provisions will be subject to the Illinois "Uniform Arbitration Act"
unless the parties agree otherwise. Consequently, the parties themselves determine the method of arbitration for their disputes. Section
12217 creates the Public Employee Mediation Roster, the services of
which are available to the parties upon request. However, the parties
are always free to choose other mediators. 21 8 The parties may also, by
mutual agreement, request a mediator to perform fact-finding as set
forth in Section 13. Under this provision, the Board must submit a
panel of seven people from the Mediation Roster to the parties within
three days of the parties request. The parties then choose one of the
seven to serve as fact-finder. The fact-finder acts independently of the
Board and may be the same person who initially conducted the mediation. The fact-finder sets up the timetable for hearings and determines
which issues are in dispute. Within forty-five days of the appointment,
the fact-finder sends the parties written findings of fact and recommendations for resolution of the dispute and publishes these findings and
conclusions in a newspaper. The findings are only advisory and are not
binding on the parties. Should the parties reject the recommendations
they can resume negotiations. 21 9 As the legislative history points out,
however, if the parties agree to binding arbitration, both the employer
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.

ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
ILL.
ILL.

REV.
REV.
REV.
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REV.

STAT.
STAT.
STAT.
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Ch.
Ch.
Ch.
Ch.
Ch.

48,
48,
48,
48,
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§
§
§
§
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14(1) (1983).
7 (1983).
12 (1983).
12(c) (1983).
13 (1983).
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and the employees would have to abide by an award. 220
Similarly, the IELRA allows parties to submit unresolved issues
concerning the terms of a new collective bargaining agreement to final
and binding arbitration if the parties mutually agree to such arbitraiion.221 The IELRA also provides an impasse procedure which requires mediation when the parties have failed to reach an agreement
within fifteen days of the start of the school year. 222 However, the legis-

lative history makes it abundantly clear, binding arbitration on contract terms may be imposed only if the parties agreed to such
arbitration. 223 Despite the voluntary nature of the provision, opponents of the IELRA voiced concerns similar to those expressed with
regard to the IPLRA, specifically, that arbitration places the decision
making process in the hands of a third party, 224 and that it raises the
possibility of forced tax increases. 225 However, the legislature determined that the need for a vehicle for the efficient and orderly resolution
of labor disputes in the field of education outweighed these concerns.
IX.

GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES

It has been said that grievance arbitration procedures are the very
heart of the collective bargaining process. 2 26 Both the IPLRA and the
IELRA reflect this philosophy by requiring that collective bargaining
agreements contain grievance resolution procedures. Under Section
8227 of the IPLRA, any collective bargaining agreement negotiated between an employer and the exclusive representative must contain a
grievance mechanism for the resolution of disputes concerning the administration or interpretation of the agreement. Unless the parties
agree otherwise, the collective bargaining agreement shall provide for
final and binding arbitration of such disputes and must contain a nostrike provision. Grievance procedures of any collective bargaining
220. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Debate on S.B. 536, June 23, 1983.
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1 1712, § 12 (1983).
222. See § VII supra at 910 for a discussion of the impasse procedure.
223. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education, Hearings
on H.B. 1530, (May 6, 1983). Representative Stuffle. House Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 36 (May 18,
1983).
224. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education, Hearings
on H.B. 1530, (May 6, 1983). Charles Rose, Attorney for Illinois Association of School Boards.
"... [W]e are opposed to any kind of permissive language in a bill which would allow for interest
arbitration. What you are doing with that is taking the decisionmaking process away from the
parties involved in the contract and putting it into the hands of a third party."
225. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 35 (June 27, 1983).
226. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1959).
227. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1608, § 8 (1983).
221.
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agreement are subject to the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act. 228
Under the IPLRA the determination of whether grievances will be
submitted to final and binding arbitration is made by the parties during
the collective bargaining process. However, this was not always the
case. The bill, as submitted to the Governor, provided for mandatory
binding arbitration of grievances. 229 The Governor inserted the words
"unless mutually agreed otherwise" and he also added the requirement
of a no-strike provision, should binding arbitration be chosen. 230 Presumably, the no-strike provision constitutes the usual quidpro quo for
the employer's concession to binding arbitration.
In contrast, the IELRA provides that any negotiated agreement
between the employees' representatives and the educational employer
must contain a grievance procedure requiring binding arbitration of
disputes concerning the administration or interpretation of the agreement.2 3 ' Additionally, the agreement must contain a no-strike clause.
Mandatory binding arbitration of contract grievances was provided for
in the IELR4 as originally introduced. 232 During committee hearings
on the bill, opponents pointed out that binding arbitration would remove elected officials from the dispute resolution process and place ultimate authority over disputes in the hands of outside arbitrators. They
233
were opposed to this result even in the case of contract grievances.
Proponents of the bill stressed the necessity of grievance resolution
once a contract is in place and the fact that binding arbitration comes
into play only at that point. 234 They emphasized that employees would
be precluded from striking over contract grievances. 235 The fact that
grievance arbitration remains mandatory under the IELR,4 may indicate legislative recognition of the inherent differences between educational employees and other public workers. It also reflects a strong
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 10,
101-123 (1983).
S.B. 536 as Enrolled § 8, p. 15.
Governor's Amendatory Veto Messagse on S.B. 536, p. 4 (September 23, 1983).
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1710, § 10(c) (1983).
H.B. 1530 as introduced § II(b), April 14, 1983.
83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education, H.B.

1530, (May 6, 1983).
234. Representative Nelson expressed concern as to who would conduct the binding arbitration. Representative Stuffle replied "It can be a third party that submits it. They can work that

out in a grievance procedure. The point is that once you put the contract language in place by
mutual consent, you need a grievance procedure over the contract, . . . You've got to decide on
those grievances. That's not an unresolved issue in the contract. I think that's what we have to
keep in mind. That's grievance over the language that's in place that they both agreed to." 83rd
Gen. Assem., House Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education Hearings on H.B. 1530,

(May 6, 1983).
235.

83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education Hearings

on H.B. 1530, (May 6, 1983).
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public policy disfavoring labor strife during the term of a contract. 236
Another distinction between the grievance procedures of the two
Acts is presented by the provisions governing unfair labor practices.
Under the IPLR,4, as previously noted, arbitration is subject to the Illinois Uniform Arbitration Act. A party seeking review of the arbitrator's decision would follow the procedures outlined under that Act.
Failure to abide by an award presumably would amount to a breach of
contract. Under section 16 of the IPLRA, 2 37 an aggrieved party may
bring suit in circuit court for violations of agreements after exhausting
any arbitration mandated by the Act.
In contrast, the IELRA makes failure to comply with a binding
arbitration award an unfair labor practice. 238 This provision was contained in the bill from its inception and was not specifically addressed
during the legislative proceedings. The effect of the provision is to trigger the unfair labor practice procedures outlined in the Act. 239 This
procedure allows a charging party to apply directly to the Board for
relief. At that juncture, the Board would determine if in fact an unfair
labor practice had occurred. In a case of failure to comply with an
arbitration award, the decision would often be fairly clear cut. However, in making that determination the Board may also engage in contract interpretation and review the equity of award, functions usually
left to the courts. While the legislature did not comment on the provision, it is consistent with the general policy objective underlying the
ZELRA of providing an efficient system for the resolution of conflicts
240
arising during the course of a collective bargaining agreement.
The Governor added to both the IPLRA and the IELRA provisions 24 ' allowing labor boards the discretion to defer to arbitration
236. Both the IELRA and the IPLRA provide that the costs of arbitration are to be borne
equally betwen the parties. Furthermore, section 6 of the IELRA and section 12 of the IPLA
provide for the establishment of a Mediation Roster, the services of which are available to the
parties for arbitration of grievences.
237. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1616, § 16 (1983).
238. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1714, § 14(a)(8), (b)(6) (1983).
239. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1715, § 15 (1983).
240. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1701, § 1 (1983); Governor's Amendatory Veto of H.B. 1530,
general statement of purpose (September 23, 1983).
241. The IELRA provides ". . . that if an alleged unfair labor practice involves interpretation
or application of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement and said agreement contains a
grievance and arbitration procedure, the Board may defer the resolution of such dispute to the
grievance and arbitration procedure contained in said agreement." ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1714, § 14(a)(5) (1983). The IPLRA provision can be found in § I I(i), "If an unfair labor practice
charge involves the interpretation or application of a collective bargaining agreement and said
agreement contains a grievance procedure with binding arbitration as its terminal step, the Board
may defer the resolution of such dispute to the grievance and arbitration procedure contained in
said agreement." ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1611, § lI(i) (1983).
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when an alleged unfair labor practice involves the interpretation or application of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 24 2 During
the proceedings concerning the IPLRA, the legislators indicated that it
was their intention that the Board be permitted to defer to arbitration
as the NLRB does in the private sector. 243 Furthermore, while discussing the Act in general terms, they indicated that the Board should consider the same factors used by the NLRB in determining whether or
244
not deferral is appropriate.
It should be noted that the NLRB's position on deferral has fluctuated somewhat over the years, and has changed since the Illinois Statutes were drafted. In one of its most recent rulings on the subject,
United Technologies Corporation,245 the NLRB reinstated the doctrine
of pre-arbitral deferral established by Collyer Insulated Wire,246 and its
progeny, and the post-arbitral deferral policy set forth in Speilburg
Mfg., Co. 247 United Technologiesover-ruled an earlier decision which
had substantially undercut the vitality of Collyer and which represented the NLRB position on deferral at the time of the Illinois debates. 24 8 United Technologies indicated that the Collyer doctrine had
withstood the tests of judicial scrutiny and practical application. Furthermore, the NLRB noted that the doctrine is a reflection of the federal policy favoring voluntary arbitration and dispute settlement. In
light of the legislature's expressed desire to follow the overall policies
of the NLRB and the NLRA, it is unlikely that they intended to follow
the long-standing doctrines of Collyer and Speilburg.
An interesting issue, not addressed by the legislature, is whether
the Acts impose on unions a duty of fair representation, and if so,
whether that duty is breached by a failure to invoke grievance arbitration. In the private sector, the duty of fair representation is rooted in
section 9(a) of the NLR/4. 249 Although the provision does not expressly
242. Governor's Amendatory Veto Message on H.B. 1530, p. 8 (September 23, 1983). Governor's Amendatory Veto Message on S.B. 536, p. 5 (September 23, 1983).
243. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, p. 301 (May 27, 1983).
244. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, p. 299 (May 27, 1983).
245. United Technologies Corporation and Aeronautical Industrial District 91, International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, AFL-CIO et al., 268 NLRB 83 (1984).
246. 192 NLRB 837 (1971).
247. 112 NLRB 1080 (1955).
248. General American Transportation Corp., 228 NLRB 808 (1977). (The Board found that
deferral was not appropriate in cases alleging violations of sections 8(a)(1) and (3) and 8(b)(I)(A)
and (2). Furthermore, the Board indicated that deferral should only be allowed where Congrsess
has granted the Board authority to do so.)
249. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982). "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes,
shall be the exclusive representatives of all employees in such unit for the purposes of collective
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impose such an obligation, the duty of fair representation is derived
from the nature of the representative's role as the exclusive representative of all of the employees. 250 The IPLR,4 contains almost the identical language of this provision in sections 6(b) and (c). However, the
IPLR,4 goes one step further. Section 6(d) provides that the exclusive
representative is responsible for representing the interests of all public
employees in the unit; however, the representative retains the right to
refuse to process employee grievances it finds unmeritorious. 25' This
provision reflects judicial rulings in fair representation cases in the private sector.252 In light of the legislature's overall intent to follow the
NLR,4 as interpreted by the courts, it is reasonable to assume the legislature intended that public employee representatives retain the same
discretion private sector representatives enjoy in grievance
253
processing.
Whether a breach of the duty of fair representation will constitute
an unfair labor practice remains to be seen. 254 A factor in that determination may be whether the employee has the right to invoke grievance
arbitration independently of the exclusive representative. 25 5 If employees are granted independent access to the grievance resolution
processes, it is less likely that an unwarranted refusal by a representative to seek redress of an employee's grievance would amount to an
unfair labor practice.
The IELR,4 does not contain a provision akin to section 6(d) of
the IPLR,4. However section 3(b)2 5 6 of the Act tracks the language of
bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment or other conditions of employment: Provided,That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the
intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the
terms of a collective bargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Providedfurther, That the
bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment."
250. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). (In the leading case on the duty of fair representation,
the Court found that the union has a statutory duty to fairly represent all employes both in collective bargaining with the employer and in its enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement.)
251. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, p 1606, § 6(d) (1983).
252. Vaca, supra note 52. (A breach of the unions duty occurs only when their handling of the
grievance is arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith.) Another issue is what the appropriate standard will be for determining when a breach has occured. See Graf v. Elgin Joliet & Eastern Ry.
Co., 697 F.2d 771, 778 (7th Cir. 1983). (Case arose under the Railway Labor Act. The court
imposed a very strict standard. A breach occurs only when the representative "deliberately and
unjustifiably refuses to represent the worker. Negligence even gross negligence . . . is not
enough.")
253. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536 p. 298, (May 27, 1983).
254. Cf OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4117.1l(B)(6) (Page 1983); a failure to fairly represent all
public employees in a bargaining unit is expressly included in the list of unfair labor practices.
255. Cf IOWA ADMIN. CODE § 20.18 (1983): requires approval of both the employee organization and the employee to invoke arbitration in the resolution of grievances.
256. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1703, § 3(b) (1983).
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section 9(a) of the NLRAA. 2. 7 Although the history of the IELRiA does
not comment on either the duty of fair representation or the applicability of the NLRA in this area the legislature's intention to grant educational employees rights similar to those enjoyed by private sector
employees would seem to carry with it an intent to impose on educational bargaining representatives duties similar to those borne by their
private sector counterparts.

X.

FAIR SHARE REQUIREMENTS

The risk of "free riders" 25 8 exists in the private sector as well as the
public sector. 259 The Illinois public sector collective bargaining acts
deal with this problem by allowing public employers and exclusive representatives the right to negotiate for a provision in the collective bargaining agreement requiring "fair share" payments from non-union
260
members.
Under the IPLRA, fair share is defined as an employee's "proportionate share of the costs of the collective bargaining process, contract
administration and pursuing matters affecting wages, hours and other
conditions of employment, [not exceeding] the amount of dues uniformly required of members ....,,261 The IELRA does not expressly
provide a method for calculating a fair share. It provides only that
non-member employees may be required to pay a fair share fee "for
services rendered" not in excess of the amount of union dues. 26 2 Despite the absence of a specific definition of fair share for purposes of the
IELRA, the elements of fair share listed in the IPLRA would seem to
be appropriate considerations in determining the fair share of an educational employee. In fact, the IELRA as submitted to the Governor,
contained almost the exact language found in the IPLRA. 263 Furthermore, it was the legislature's expressed intention that the fair share provisions in both Acts comport with existing judicial precedent on the
subject. 264 It is highly unlikely the Governor disavowed this intention
257. See supra note 249.
258. Free Rider is a term used to describe those employees who derive the benefits of a union's
efforts without having to pay for them through membership. Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209, 222 (1974).
259. Id.at 224.
260. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1711, § 11, 1606, § 6(e) (1983).
261. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1603, § 3(g) (1983).
262. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1711, § 11 (1983).
263. H.B. 1530 as Enrolled, § 13, p. 13.
264. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education, Hearings
on H.B. 1530, (May 6, 1983); Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, p. 32 (June 27, 1983). Senator Bruce
stated "We drew this language right from the Aboodcase, you cannot make political contribu-
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in rewriting the provision, particularly in light of the provisions he added to both Acts. 265 These provisions preclude political contributions
(amounts used to support union political activities) from constituting
any part of the fair share fee unless voluntarily made. This is a reflection of the Supreme Court's holding in Abood v. Detroit Board of
266
Education.
In addition, both the IPLRA and the IELRA contain a "religious
exception" to the fair share requirement which preserves the right of
267
non-association of employees based on bona fide religious reasons.
This language is similar to that of section 19 of the NLRA. 268 Unlike
the NLRA, the Illinois Acts do not require that the religious organization in question have historically objected to supporting labor organizations. Furthermore, the Illinois Acts provide that an amount equal to
the fair share fee must be paid to a non-religious charitable organization agreed upon by the employees affected and the exclusive representative. If the parties are unable to agree on a charity, each Labor Board
may establish a list of charities to which the fee may be paid. The
Illinois Acts are more restrictive in this respect than the NLRA, which
allows the fair share payment to be made to a non-religious, nonlabor,
charitable fund exempt from federal taxation under 26 U.S.C.
501(c)(3), chosen by the employee from three such groups designated in
the contract.
Both the IPLRA and the IELRiA provide that fair share fees will
automatically be deducted by the employer from the employee's earnings and paid to the representative. Opponents of the fair share provision in the IPLRA argued that a fair share payment was actually a
forced share since the alternative is not to work. 269 Proponents countions. The only thing you can ask them to pay is the cost of collective bargaining, contract administration, matters affecting wages, hours and conditions of employment, that is it. . . . Very
narrow."; Senate Debate on S.B. 536, p. 300 (May 27, 1983).
265. Governor's Amendatory Veto Message on H.B. 1530, p. 7 (September 23, 1983). Governor's Amendatory Veto Message on S.B. 536, p. 2 (September 23, 1983).
266. Abood, supra Note 258, (The Court upheld a Michigan statute's "agency shop" provision
requiring the payment of a fair share fee as a condition of employment in so far as the fee was
used by the union for collective bargaining, contract administration and grievance adjustment
purposes. 431 U.S. at 225-26). See also Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship
Clerks, Freighthandlers, Express & Station Employees, - U.S. -, 104 S.Ct. 1883 (1984). (Plaintiffs challenged fair share contributions used for union conventions, social activities, publications,
litigation not involving the negotiation of contracts or grievances and organizing efforts. The
Court allowed contribution on the first three items, but denied it on the latter two.)
1711, § 11 (1983).
267. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1606, § 6(g) (1983),
268. 29 U.S.C. § 169 (1982).
269. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Labor and Commerce, Hearings on S.B. 536,
(June 8, 1983). Representative Mays; Senate Debate on S.B. 536, p. 105 (June 30, 1983); Senator
Hudson.
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tered, under both Acts, that no one was actually required to join a
union 270 and that the respective provisions were in accord with existing
case law. Since fair share payments may be made a condition of employment under the IPLRA, 27 1 the automatic deduction ensures receipt
of the payments, while preventing occasion for discharge for failure to
pay.

272

The IPLR,4's and the IELR,4's authorization of fair share provisions presents two significant issues. First, a jurisdictional question exists as to the appropriate entity to handle challenges to fair share fees.
The IPLR,4 specifically provides that "the making of" fair share agreements by a public employer and the exclusive representative shall not
be deemed an unfair labor practice. 273 Another provision allows the
the exclusive representative to prescribe rules for the acquisition and
retention of membership and the determination of fair share payments. 274 While the express wording of these provisions merely sanctions fair share arrangements, they seem to reflect an underlying, albeit
unexpressed, desire to preclude Board jurisdiction over problems associated with fair share arrangements.
In contrast, the IELRA's provisions governing unfair labor practices do not mention fair share arrangements. This omission would
seem to allow a challenge to the validity of a fair share provision. It
would follow from this reasoning that the Board, as opposed to the
courts, would have initial jurisdiction over fair share disputes arising
under the IELR,,. However, the intent of the legislature that the fair
share provisions should reflect existing case law would seem to exclude
challenges to fair share arrangements from Board jurisdiction.
The resolution of the second fair share issue may well render the
first issue moot. The second issue is the determination of the fair share
amount. As previously discussed, the amount can only include contributions to cover specific expenditures, and in no case may it exceed
union dues. 275 Under both the IPLRA 2 76 and the IELRA, 277 the actual
270. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, p. 298 (May 27, 1983). Senator Collins;
Senate Debate on H.B. 1530, pp. 30-31 (June 27, 1983). Senator Bruce.
271. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1610, § 10(a)(2) (1983). The IELRA does not expessly state
that payment of fair share fees is a "condition of employment"; however it may be implied from
the fact that fair share provisions are authorized to be included in the collective bargaining agreement and since automatic deduction seems to be tantamount to "a condition of employment".
272.

See Board of Educ. of the School District for the City of Detroit v. Parks, 417 Mich 268,

335 N.W.2d 641 (1983) (upholding the payment of agency fees as a condition of employment).
273. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1610, § 10(a)(2) (1983).
274.

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

11610, § 10(b)(I) (1983).

275. Both of the Illinois Acts omit the NLRA's provision making excessive union fees an unfair labor practice. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(5) (1982). This, of course, is logical since the Illinois Acts
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amount required is determined by the exclusive representative. An immediate problem surfaces-how can an employee insure that the
amount includes only those sums statutorily and constitutionally allowed? This problem did not completely escape the legislature's eye.
At one point in the proceedings on the IPLR,4, Senator Keats proposed
that unions be required to file copies of annual reports, by-laws, and a
listing of dues schedules with the Board in order to disclose the disposition of union funds.278 These requirements are similar to those found
in the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959.279
The suggestion was rebuffed with the proviso that, should the need
280
arise, the legislature could consider amending the Act.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals may have already resolved
the issue to some extent in the recent case of Hudson v. Chicago Teachers Union Local No. 1, et al.28 1 The court allowed plaintiffs, non-member teachers, to bring an action against the union and the school board,
under 42 U.S.C. 1983, attacking the procedure established in the collective bargaining agreement for determining the amount of the fair share
fee. The court found that, even where the money collected is not used
for impermissable purposes, neither the State nor its agencies could
force non-member dissenters to support a union without due process.
The court found that the public employer "must establish a procedure
that will make reasonably sure that the wages of non-union employees
will not be used to support. . . the union's political activities not germane to collective bargaining. ' 282 The court also found that the defendants owed a "due process" duty to the plaintiffs-"the procedure
must make reasonably sure that those employees' wages will not be
used to support any union activities that are not germane to collective
'283
bargaining, whether or not the activities are political or ideological.
Clearly, this places a substantial burden on both the public employer
and the exclusive representative to ensure that the fair share fee is a
constitutionally accurate amount. Presumably, this in turn will force
union disclosure of the uses of funds attributable to fair share
do not provide for union shops. It may however become relevant since the maximum amount a
fair share fee is determined by the amount of union dues. On the other hand, this too may become
moot in light of the guidelines established by the Seventh Circuit.
276. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1606, § 6(e) (1983).
277. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1711, § 11 (1983).
278. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, pp. 55-56 (May 25, 1983).
279. 29 U.S.C. § 401-531 (1970).
280. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on S.B. 536, p. 57 (May 25, 1983).
281. No. 83-3118, slip op. (7th Cir. Sept. 6, 1984).
282. Id
283. Id.
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284

payments.
The issue then becomes the determination of adequate procedures.
Without precluding the possibility of alternative procedures, the court
suggested that "the constitutional minimum would be fair notice, a
prompt administrative hearing before the Board of Education or some
other state or local agency-the hearing to incorporate the usual safeguards for evidentiary hearings before administrative agencies-and a
right of judicial review of the agency's decision. ' 285 The court also
noted that an internal union remedy and an arbitration procedure is
unlikely to satisfy the requirements. Unless an alternative procedure
can be found which passes constitutional muster, it would appear the
court has also answered the question of jurisdiction.
Finally, IPLR,4 section 6(f) permits the exclusive representative
and the employer to include a provision in the collective bargaining
agreement requiring union dues checkoff upon written authorization
from the employee member. The IELRA once contained a similar provision, but the Governor deleted it in his amendatory veto without
comment. Section 22, however, amends portions of the school code to
allow for such deductions.
XI.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES

Both the IPLRi4 and the IELRA enumerate certain unfair labor
practices. 286 The IPLRA covers unfair labor practices under section
10.28 7 Since it was the legislature's expressed intention to follow the
NLR,4 to the extent possible, a comparison may prove instructive. The
provisions governing employer unfair labor practices are taken almost
verbatim from the NLR,4. 28 8
The major differences between the IPLA4 and the NLRA appear
in the provisions governing labor organization unfair labor practices.
For the most part, the IPLRA tracks the language of the NLRA, but
284. It is conceivable that a union, and an employer, may forego the benefit of fair share
provisions in the collective bargaining agreement in order to avoid the administrative difficulties
of disclosure or running afoul of the constitutional requirements.
285.

No. 83-3118, slip op. (7th Cir. Sept. 6, 1984).

286. The purpose of this section is merely to compare the provisions devoted to unfair labor
practices and to point out the notable differences. Substantive analysis of several of the individual
unfair labor practice will be addressed in the appropriate section for that practice, where the
legislative history has commented on it.
287.
288.

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
1610, § 10 (1983).
29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1982). There is, however, one notable difference. The NLRA allows

an employer and an exclusive representative to make an agreement requiring union membership
and then proceeds to delineate the circumstances under which this may be effectuated. The IPLR,, allows the parties to enter an agreement requiring fair share payments.
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there are some noteworthy omissions. The following matters covered
by the NL_4 are not addressed by the IEL,4: secondary boycotts or
strikes, 289 hot cargo agreements; 290 pre-hire agreements in the construction industry; 29 1 excessive union fees; 292 featherbedding; 293 health care.
Although it is clear that the legislature was not unaware of these provisions, 294 it gave no reason for the omissions. The most significant of
these omissions may prove to be the absence of provisions relating to
secondary boycotts or secondary picketing.2 95 For example, a union
may represent both public and private sector employees. In an effort to
put pressure on the private sector employer, they may picket the public
employer in order to coerce it into cutting off relations with the private
employer. In the alternative, where the union seeks to place pressure
on the public employer, (where its ability to do so is more limited) they
may threaten to strike the private sector employer. The legislature may
simply have failed to consider the possibility of such secondary actions,
or it may have anticipated that such activities would be precluded
2 96
under section 8(b)(4) of the NLRA.
The IELk4's unfair labor practices 297 section is a bare bones version of that of the IPLR,4. The absence of many of the provisions here
may be partially the result of the same factors discussed with respect to
the IPLR,1, and partially attributable to the unique setting presented in
the area of education.2 98 In addition to all the omissions of the IPL.&1,
the IELRA also omits recognitional picketing.2 99 The IELRA4 does,
however, add failure to comply with a binding arbitration award as an
289. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4) (1982).
290. 29 U.S.C. § 158(e) (1982).
291. 29 U.S.C. § 158(0 (1982).
292. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(5) (1982). See notes 275.
293. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6) (1982).
294. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Labor and Commerce, Hearings on S.B. 536,
(June 8, 1983).
295. Presumably, certain forms of primary picketing will be allowed under the Act as
permissable "concerted activities" guaranteed by § 6. (See § V supraat 902 for discussion of "concerted activities.") "Mass" or "threatening" picketing could arguably be considered an unfair
labor practice under § 10(b)(4), as a failure to bargain in good faith.
296. See Plumbers, Streamfitters, Refrigeration Petroleum Fitters and Apprentices of Local
298, A.F. of L. et al v. County of Door, et al., 359 U.S. 354 (1959). (The Court found that a
"county" was a "person" within the meaning of § 8(b)(4) of the NLRAI and therefore entitled to
protection); Local No. 16 International Longshoremen and Warehousemen's Union and the City
of Juneau, 176 NLRB 889 (1969). (Primary and secondary employers were both political subdivisions of Alaska. The Board concluded that they were "persons" engaged in commerce under the
Act's secondary boycott provisions.)
297. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1714, § 14 (1983).
298. Perhaps a useful approach to interpreting this section of the IELRA would be a comparison to other states' educational labor relations Acts.
299. See § III supra at 896.
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unfair labor practice by either the employer or the labor organization.3°° Both the IELt.4 and the IPLR,4 make a violation of any of
the rules which the Board may promulgate governing election conduct
an unfair labor practice. Furthermore, it is an unfair labor practice
under both Acts for an employer to discriminate against an employee
for having signed or filed an affidavit, petition or charge or for providing information or testimony. Presumably, the affidavits, petitions,
charges, information and testimony referred to are those connected
with employment matters. The IELR,4 further prohibits discrimination against employees who have signed an authorization card in connection with union representation. The IPLRA also makes it a
violation for the labor organization to so discriminate.
XII.

UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE PROCEDURES

The procedures to be followed in the event of an unfair labor practice charge are found in section 11 of the IPLR,430 1 and sections 15 and
16 of the IELRA. 30 2 The procedure used by the IPL), is very similar
to that of the NLRA. 30 3 It differs in three notable respects. First, the
ZPLRA allows a complaint to issue based on an unfair labor practice
that occurred more than six months prior to the filing of the charge
with the Board if the aggrieved person did not reasonably have knowledge of the unfair labor practice. 30 4 The language of the NLRA limits
its exception to the six month rule to cases where the person was prevented from filing the charge due to military service. 30 5 Secondly, the
IPLR,4 indicates that neither the Board, nor the person conducting the
hearing, shall be bound by the rules of evidence applicable to courts,
with the exception of rules of privilege recognized by law. 30 6 The
NLR,4, on the other hand, requires that proceedings comply as nearly
as possible with the federal rules of evidence. 30 7 Finally, the NLR,4
gives priority to certain kinds of unfair labor practices. 30 8 The IPLRA4
does not accord similar priority to any particular types of unfair labor
practices.
A significant procedural omission from the IELRA is the absence
300.
301.
302.
303.

See § IX supra at 922.
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,
29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982).

1611, § 11 (1983).
1715-1716, §§ 15-16 (1983).

304.

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

1611, § Il(a) (1983).

305.
306.
307.
308.

29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1982). The IPLRA also contains this provision.
See supra note 304.
See supra note 305.
29 U.S.C. § 160(l),(m) (1982).
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of a requirement that the Board initiate an investigation of an unfair
labor practice charge.30 9 Because the existence of an unfair labor practice is often determinative of the legality of a strike, 3 10 the speed with
which the Board investigates a charge can significantly affect the efficacy of the employees' right to strike. Undue delay by the Board in
resolving this threshold issue would alter the bargaining positions of
the parties to the detriment of the employees.
The IELRiA procedures are even further scaled-down. There is no
statutory exception to the six month time limit on filing charges, nor is
there any mention as to the appropriate rules of evidence. Furthermore, while the IPLR,, 3 11 and NLR4 3 12 indicate that the appropriate
burden of proof is a preponderance of the evidence, the IELRA is silent
with respect to that issue. Nor is the Board granted statutory authority
to amend its findings or orders prior to the case being filed in court, as
it is in the IPLRA3 13 and the NLR,4. 3 14 Presumably, any deficiencies in
the procedure outlined in the Act can be supplemented by rules and
3 15
regulations promulgated by the Board.
The IELR4's provision underwent a significant change in the
Governor's hands. As passed by of the General Assembly, the bill provided that the Regional Superintendent would handle unfair labor
practice charges, except in the case of State colleges and universities, or
State agencies whose major function is providing educational services.
A party aggrieved by an order of the Regional Superintendent could
then obtain review by the Board. 3 16 This arrangement met with the
criticism that regional superintendents lacked the requisite expertise in
3 17
collective bargaining and labor law to make those kinds of decisions.
Opponents of the procedure also charged that it would result in inconsistent decisions and wanted the Board to administer unfair labor prac309. The Board investigates unfair labor practice charges. If they find that a charge involves a
dispositive issue of a law or fact they issue a complaint. The person charged is then served with
the complaint and notice of the hearing to be held not less than five days after service of the
complaint. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1611, § II(a) (1983).
310. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1618, § 18(a) (1983). In light of the immediacy of the situation,
it is reasonable to presume that the board will decide the issue within the seventy-two hour time
frame, thereby possibly averting a strike.
311.

ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48,

1611, § II(c) (1983).

312. 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1982).
313. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1611, § II(d) (1983).
314. 29 U.S.C. § 160(d) (1982).
315. ILL. REV. STAT. Ch. 48, 1705, § 5(h) (1983).
316. House Bill 1530 as Enrolled pp. 18-19.
317. 83rd Gen. Assem., House Committee on Elementary and Secondary Education, (May 6,
1983). Jerry Petty, Illinois Community College Trustees Association.

CHICAGO KENT L.AW REVIEW

tices. 318 Senator Bruce explained that the reasoning behind the
provision was to allow the person who is closest to local issues to make
the decision as to what constitutes an unfair labor practice. 31 9 Subserequently the Governor, without comment, placed the administrative
320
sponsibility for unfair labor practices in the hands of the Board.
CONCLUSION

With the enactment of the IPLR,4 and IELRA the Illinois Legislature sought to resolve the turmoil that often surrounds public sector
collective bargaining. The Acts grant both employers and employees
statutorily protected bargaining rights. In addition, the Acts specify
when employers can strike, provide for arbitration and grievance procedures, and proscribe certain actions as unfair labor practices.
The Legislature attempted to resolve many of the conflicts that
have traditionally arisen in the public sector labor relations. Although
the Acts establish extensive guidelines for the resolution of these conflicts, some issues remain open. Therefore, it appears that the courts
will play an important role in the continuing development of public
sector labor law in Illinois.

318. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on H.B. 1530 pp. 152-153, (June 23, 1983). Senator
Kustra proposed to amend the bill by removing the regional superintendent's jurisdiction in the
area of unfair labor practices and give the State Board of Education the responsibility. The
amendment failed to pass.
319. 83rd Gen. Assem., Senate Debate on H.B. 1530 pp. 153-154, (June 23, 1983).
320. Governor's Amendatory Veto Message on H.B. 1530, p. 8 (September 23, 1983).
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